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The Effect of United Nations Peacekeeping Interventions on Civil War Duration                         
A Case Study Approach 
Abstract 
 Factors of civil war duration, such as contraband, natural resources, ethnic 
fractionalization, and geography have been immensely studied. While there is a general 
consensus that the mentioned factors effect duration, there is less consensus on the role other 
factors, namely external intervention, play in civil war duration. Some scholars claim external 
intervention, specifically United Nations intervention, to be directly correlated with increasing a 
conflict’s duration, while others find the contrary. There is a remaining question, however, that is 
not addressed within the literature: the effect of United Nations intervention on civil war length. I 
argue that the UN’s intervention should have little effect. In order to analyze the effect of UN 
intervention, it is necessary to examine: the role of UN intervention in conflicts that are expected 
to be different in duration, the different types of UN peacekeeping operations, and the effect of 
the interests of the Permanent Five on peacekeeping operations and civil war duration. Through 
examining the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Colombia, the analysis proved that the 
relationship between UN intervention and duration is most direct in longer lasting conflicts, that 
UN Observer and Verification Missions are actually most effective in altering a conflict’s 
duration, and that the Permanent Five’s interests largely determine a mission’s success.  
 
Introduction 
  
 What is the effect, if any, of United Nations interventions on civil war duration? Does 
United Nations peacekeeping intervention into a civil war while fighting is occurring prolong the 
period of war, usher in peace, or have no independent effect? Essentially, is the direct correlation 
between external intervention and longer civil war duration, which many scholars propose, true?  
 The end of the Cold War sparked renewed scholarly interest in all aspects of civil war 
study. It has been found that while the number of new civil wars starting each year is rather low, 
at a rate of 2.3 per year, the number of civil wars ending each year is only at a rate of 1.85 per 
year; more civil wars are breaking out than those that are ending, thus leading to more civil wars 
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in any given year (Fearon 2004, 275). It is important to study civil war duration because as with 
each additional year of war the costs to the domestic population and to the country as a whole 
increase dramatically. For instance, the war in Angola had a significant effect on the civilian 
population, as each additional year of fighting saw increased causality rates. The best estimates 
indicate that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the number of civilian causalities resulting from 
one-sided violence with the main rebel groups was less than one hundred. However, as the 
conflict progressed, this number steadily increased with hundreds and even thousands killed in 
any given year up until 2002 when a peace agreement was signed (“Angola: General One-sided 
violence Information”). Additionally, each continued year of fighting in Angola had detrimental 
impacts on the economy. Apart for a few years in the middle of the war, the GDP per capita 
steadily decreased and remained well under the per capita income in the years after the conflict 
ended (“GDP per Capita”). This trend is seen among many civil war cases, thus highlighting the 
importance of studying civil war duration and the factors effecting duration.  
 Interestingly, since the end of the Cold War, the average duration of civil wars has 
increased dramatically; as in 1999 the average length of a civil war was approximately sixteen 
years, while in the early 1990s the average duration of wars in progress was roughly twelve years 
(Fearon 2004, 275).  With empirical evidence finding that the overall duration of civil wars are 
now increasing due to internal characteristics of the conflicts themselves, scholarly work has 
now shifted to include those associated with civil war duration. Scholars have hypothesized 
many factors to have a correlation, either positive or negative, with civil war duration. These 
factors include, but are not limited to: ethnic fractionalization, per capita income, indigenous 
land claims, geography, economic growth, external intervention and lootable resources.  
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 The effect of external intervention is unique because the success of intervention, which is 
most simply defined as ending violent conflict, can be argued to be largely dependent on many 
other factors associated with duration. Many times external intervention is deemed a failure 
because it fails to end fighting, and perhaps wrongly assumed to increase the duration of a 
conflict. Some prominent scholars have called into question the direct relationship of factors, 
such as ethnic fractionalization and per capita income, on civil war duration.  These scholars 
argue the effect of these factors is actually rather small; that the effects of these factors of 
duration are rather ‘picked up’ by other factors’ direct relationship on civil war duration. 
Interestingly few, if any, scholars have hypothesized whether the relationship between external 
intervention and duration is as robust and as many have speculated. The data which the academic 
community has used to determine the effect of external intervention fails to take into account that 
external intervention may not independently affect the duration of civil wars; rather those 
countries that the United Nations intervenes in are already those cases that are expected to have a 
long duration. It is academically, as well as practically important to determine whether the 
relationship between civil war duration and external intervention is a direct bivariate relationship 
as most scholars have proposed, or whether it is actually a multivariate relationship, in which 
external intervention is not the most determinant variable in the relationship. 
 It is particularly important to focus on the effect of external intervention because of the 
policy implications, such as when should international organizations like the UN intervene and 
should they intervene at all. For the purposes of this paper external intervention refers 
specifically to United Nations multilateral peacekeeping missions and Security Council 
Resolutions. Multilateral, or multi dimensional peacekeeping missions, are the most often used 
mechanism used by the United Nations to “rebuild the basic institutions of the post-civil war 
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state” (Howard 2008,1). While the term peacekeeping is defined by the United Nations as a 
mechanism designed to preserve the peace in a post-conflict state (United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 18), these missions are also involved in active civil 
conflicts, as in the civil war in Angola where the United Nations launched three missions all 
during active civil war years.  In the post-Cold War era, civil war interventions and peacekeeping 
operations have increased dramatically; out of a total of sixty civil wars from the year 1988 to 
2003, the United Nations launched nineteen missions (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 42). This is in 
stark contrast to during the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War era there were sixty-three civil 
wars recorded, with the UN only launching four missions: “two in Cyprus, one in Korea, and one 
in the Congo” (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 42).  
 UN engagement and intervention in civil wars, however, goes beyond peacekeeping 
missions. The Security Council is also instrumental as they often adopt resolutions aimed at 
ending active civil conflicts. It is noted that between “1989 and 2006, the Security Council 
moved from a stance of disengagement from civil wars to one of engagement,” dramatically 
increasing its involvement in the resolution of civil wars and the peace process after the war has 
ended (Cockayne et al. 2010, 1). The Security Council has steadily increased its involvement in 
civil wars. In 1993, the Security Council “adopted resolutions on peacemaking, peacekeeping, or 
peace building in more than one-third of all active civil wars in the world” and recently, as of 
2008 the Security Council had “formally engaged in more than 40 percent of all active internal 
wars in the world –a higher share than ever before” (Cockayne et al. 2010, 1). The Cold War 
period saw relatively few United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as Security Council 
resolutions because of the fundamental differences between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The Security Council was essentially an ineffective institution during the Cold War 
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because of the veto power, which led the Soviet Union and the United States to veto numerous 
resolutions and operations that would benefit the other.  
 The end of the Cold War not only brought about more UN interventions, but also 
signaled a change of criteria for UN intervention.  While the concept of peacekeeping is not 
directly addressed within the UN Charter, many scholars associate UN peacekeeping with 
Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter, which specifically address pacific settlement of 
disputes and action with respect to threats to peace breaches and acts of aggression (Gilligan and 
Stedman and the UN Charter).  As a result of the UN Charter not directly addressing 
peacekeeping operations, the Security Council, through resolutions, decides which civil wars the 
UN should influence. In theory, the “prerequisite for [the Security Council’s] enactment is a 
threat to or an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security” (Gilligan 
and Stedman 2003, 37).  
 As seen below, there have been a total of 166 civil wars that have either ended post-Cold 
War or began in the post-Cold War period. Some have lasted much longer than others and some 
have been the recipients of United Nations intervention. The fact that some civil wars have lasted 
very long and others only a few months, establishes an important question as it addresses the 
ability of the international community to mitigate the effects of civil war.  
Table 1: Civil War Duration in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
Country Years of Conflict (Duration in Parentheses) UN Intervention? 
 
Afghanistan 1978-2001 (23); 2003-2009 (6) Yes (1st conflict) 
Algeria 1991-2009* No 
Angola* 1975-2002 (27); 1991-1998 (7); 2002-2004; (2) 
2007-2009 (2)* 
Yes (1st and 2nd 
conflicts) 
Azerbaijan 1991-1994 (3); 1993 (1); 1995 (1); 2005 (1) No 
Bangladesh 1975-1992 (17) No 
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Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1992-1995 (3); 1993-1995 (2); 1993-1994 (1) No 
Burundi 1991-2006 (15); 2008 (1) Yes (1st conflict);  
No in 2008 
Cambodia 1978-1998 (20) Yes 
Central African 
Republic 
2001-2002 (2); 2009* (1) No 
Chad 1989-1994 (5); 1997-2002 (5); 2005-2009* Yes (3rd conflict) 
Colombia* 1964-2009* (45) No 
Comoros 1997 (1) No 
Congo 1993-1994 (1); 1997-2002 (5) No 
Cote d’Ivoire 2002-2004 (2) Yes 
Croatia 1992-1995 (3) Yes 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Zaire) 
1996-2001 (5); 2006-2008 (2); 2007-2008 Yes (1st and 3rd 
conflicts) 
Djibouti 1991-1994 (3); 1999 (1) No 
Egypt 1993-1998 (5) No 
El Salvador 1979-1991 (12) Yes 
Eritrea 1997-1999 (2); 2003 (1) Yes (2nd conflict) 
Ethiopia 1964-1991 (27); 1976-1991 (15); 1977-2009* (32); 
1994-2009* (15); 1995-1996 (2); 1996 (1); 1999 (1) 
Yes (4th conflict) 
Georgia 1991-1993 (2); 1992-1993 (1); 1992 (1); 2004 (1); 
2008 (1) 
Yes (all conflicts) 
Guatemala 1965-1995 (30) No 
Guinea 2000-2001 (1) No 
Guinea-Bissau 1998-1999 (1) No 
Haiti 2004 (1) No 
India 1983-1993 (10); 1989-2009* (10); 1989-1990 (1); 
1990-2009* (19); 1992-1997 (5); 1992-2006 (14); 
1992-2009* (17); 1993-2004 (11); 1997 (1); 2000 
(1); 2005-2007 (2); 2009* (1); 2008 (1); 2008 (1) 
Yes (2nd conflict) 
Indonesia 1975-1992 (17); 1990-1991 (1); 1997-1998 (2); 
1999-2005 (6) 
 
Iran  1979-1990 (11); 1991-1993; 1993 (1); 1996 (1); 
1997-2001 (4); 2005-2009* (4) 
Yes (2nd conflict) 
Iraq 1973-1992 (19); 1991-1996 (5); 1995-1996 (2); 
2004-2009* (6) 
Yes (2nd conflict) 
Israel 1949-1996 (47); 1990-1999 (9); 2000-2009* (9); 
2006 (1) 
No 
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Laos 1989-1990 (1) No 
Lebanon 1989-1990 (2) Yes 
Lesotho 1998 (1) No 
Liberia 1989-1990 (1); 2000-2003 (3) No 
Macedonia 2001 (1) No 
Mali 1990 (1); 1994 (1); 2007-2009* (2) No 
Mexico 1996 (1) No 
Moldova 1992 (1) No 
Morocco 1975-1989 (14) No 
Mozambique 1977-1992 (15) Yes 
Myanmar 1949-1998 (49); 1990-1994 (4); 1990 (1); 1991-
1994 (3); 1992 (1); 1993-2002 (9); 1996 (1); 1997 
(1); 2000-2009* (9); 2005 (1); 2005-2009* (4); 
2009* (1) 
No 
Nepal 1996-2006 (10) No 
Nicaragua 1982-1990 (8) No 
Niger 1991-1992 (2); 1994 (1); 1995 (1); 1997 (1); 1997 
(1); 2007-2008 (2) 
No 
Nigeria 2004 (1); 2004 (1); 2009* (1) No 
Pakistan 1990 (1); 1995-1996 (1); 2004-2009* (5); 2007-
2009* (2) 
No 
Papua New Guinea 1989-1996 (7) No 
Peru 1982-1999 (17); 2007-2009* (2) No 
Philippines 1969-2009* (40); 1970-1990 (20); 1993-2009* (16) No 
Russia (Soviet Union) 1990-1991 (1); 1994-1996 (2); 1999(1); 1999-2007 
(8); 2007-2009* (2) 
No 
Rwanda 1990-1994 (3); 1997-2002 (5); 2009* (1) Yes (1st conflict) 
Senegal 1990-2003 (13) No 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 1991 (1); 1991 (1); 1998-1999 (1) No 
Sierra Leone* 1991-2000 (9) Yes 
Somalia 1982-1996 (14); 2001-2002 (2); 2006-2009* (3) Yes (1st conflict) 
Spain 1991-1992 (1) No 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1984-2009* (25); 1989-1990 (1) No 
Sudan 1983-2009* (26) Yes 
Tajikistan 1992-1998 (6) No 
Thailand 2003-2009* (6) No 
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Turkey 19984-2009* (25); 1991-1992 (2); 2005 (1) No 
Uganda 1979-1992 (13); 1994-2009* (15) Yes (2nd conflict) 
United Kingdom 1971-1991 (20) No 
United States of 
America 
2001-2009* (8) No 
Uzbekistan 2004 (1) No 
Venezuela 1992 (1) No 
Yemen (Arab Republic 
of Yemen) 
1994 (1) No 
*Italicized countries constitute the case studies of civil war in this research. 
 
 Table 1 shows the variety among civil war cases in terms of length of conflict and UN 
intervention. In the post-Cold War era there were a total of 166 civil wars, with 35 of them 
ongoing as of the end of 2009. In order to calculate the average duration of these wars, the 
ongoing civil wars were calculated with their duration up to 2009. This is because the most 
recent research on civil wars from the database used for this project was compiled at the end of 
2009.  The average duration of the 166 civil wars was approximately 6.9 years, with the standard 
deviation being approximately 9.5 years. As according to Table 1, the longest civil wars include: 
the conflict in Myanmar with a length of 49 years, the war in Israel which lasted 47 years, and 
the Colombian civil war with a duration of 45 years (as of 2009). As seen from the table there are 
many civil wars that lasted for a very short amount of time, one or two years. These conflicts are 
most often coups or popular revolutions and include the war in Comoros, Guinea, and 
Venezuela, among others. As of 2009, the United Nations intervened in 33 of the total 166 civil 
conflicts, which means the UN intervened in approximately one-fifth of all the civil wars. The 
average duration of these conflicts is approximately 7.5 years, with about half of these 
interventions in conflicts whose duration greatly exceeded the total average of 6.9 years.   
Literature Review 
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 Factors of Duration 
 Literature regarding civil war duration can be divided into general groups, in which there 
is relative consensus on how duration of conflict is affected by the factors that comprise each 
group. These groups can be divided into: economic, social, geographic, and political factors of 
duration.  While there are other variables that effect the duration of a conflict, the variables 
addressed in the following passages are largely thought to be the main determinants of civil war 
duration.   
 Civil wars, and wars in general, are not only costly in terms of risk taking but are also 
costly in terms of economics. Therefore, it is understandable that much research has been done 
regarding the economic factors that influence the duration of a conflict. There is relative 
consensus within the academic community that conflicts in which rebels use contraband 
(gemstones, narcotics, and timber) as a major source of funding will on average be longer than 
other wars. The casual mechanism as to why, however, is debatable. Contraband generally refers 
to goods that are relatively easy to produce, obtain and transport, however the key is that they are 
illegally exported or imported. Contraband commonly utilized in civil wars include opium, 
precious gems, timber, and coca (Fearon 2004, 284).  It is often thought that smuggling of these 
goods provides rebel groups with a dependable means of finance capable of supporting long 
lasting civil wars; it increases the funds available for arms purchase, and increases ease of rebel 
recruitment. Some scholars, including Buhaug et al., however have speculated that this casual 
mechanism would actually make wars shorter as it alters the balance of power among the 
fighting actors. Thus, these scholars have proposed that contraband increases the duration of a 
conflict because the steady monetary gains actually reduces the incentives for a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict, and/or because the rebel groups may instead concentrate more on 
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extracting profits and less on fighting the state (Buhaug et al. 2009, 555).  A select few, namely 
Ross, even though they acknowledge that civil wars in which contraband is present last longer 
than average, speculate the causal direction is not entirely clear, that it may be the case that 
“longer-lasting insurgencies…[are] more likely to sell contraband because they have more time 
to establish the production and trading networks they need to profit” (Ross 2006, 292).   
 Despite these speculations, it is apparent that contraband funded civil wars are typically 
longer than the average civil war. During the years 1945 to 1999 there were seventeen instances 
of contraband funding long-running civil wars (Fearon 2004, 284). These cases include, but are 
not limited to: the war in Colombia funded by cocaine, and the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone 
fueled by diamonds. According to the data used by Fearon, the average duration of contraband 
funded wars is 48.2 years, which is approximately 40 years longer than other civil wars (Fearon 
2004, 284).  It is important to note that studies have found countries that produce goods such as 
opium and precious gems are also more prone to civil war onset. Strictly in terms of civil war 
duration, however, studies have found that once a country is engaged in civil conflict, lootable 
goods are more likely to prolong war due to of the economic influence of these goods on the 
balance of capabilities between forces.   
 Increases in the world price of primary commodity exports are also found to prolong civil 
wars. Therefore, decreases in the price of primary commodities will shorten a conflict. Since 
rebellions “will only occur where and only where they are profitable…where revenues during 
conflict are atypically high and costs atypically low,” it is reasonable to see that the hypothesis of 
the effect of primary commodity on the duration of conflict holds (Collier et al. 2004, 256). If the 
price of a commodity, in which the rebels control, decreases then rebel groups will be 
underfinanced. If the world prices continue to drop opportunity costs for fighting will be high; 
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fighting will now be harder and more costly than peace, therefore prospects of peace will 
improve and a conflict is more likely to end (Collier et al. 2004, 256). 
 Duration of civil war is also negatively related to the initial per capita income (Collier et 
al. 2004, 255). Reasoning behind this finding is that if the initial per capita income in a country is 
relatively high, then the cost of conflict to society will also be high. Particular groups within 
society will therefore have more to lose by engaging and continuing to fight in civil conflict. 
This high opportunity cost will lead groups to either not engage in conflict or to not engage in a 
long-lasting conflict. When the cost of conflict to a society is high there should be a mutually 
beneficial settlement to be found in order to avoid war (Collier et al. 2004, 255). It is expected 
then that if the initial per capita income of a country is low, society has less to lose by continuing 
to engage in conflict, and therefore will choose to fight until the fighting is too costly, which may 
be many years (Collier et al. 2004, 255).  Through examining large-scale violent civil conflict 
covering the 1960-2000 period, Collier et al. empirically found that “higher income increases the 
hazard of peace and thus reduces the expected duration of conflict” (Collier et al. 2004, 262). 
Numerically, they found that a “10% increase in per capita income is associate with a 5% 
reduction in the duration of conflict” (Collier et al. 2004, 262).   
 Other scholars, most notably Fearon, have found a strong bivariate relationship between 
per capita income and duration, however they note that this relationship is not always a 
guarantee. The main outlier in this case is the 31-year civil conflict occurring in Northern 
Britain; in many datasets this is the richest country, thus providing a counter argument to the 
strong relationship between income and duration (Fearon 2004, 287). This however is a single 
outlier and does not provide a convincing argument against the case that a lower per capita 
income is strongly correlated with long-lasting civil wars. While Fearon’s studies have found 
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that there is a pattern of longer civil wars occurring in countries with initial low per capita 
income, he hypothesizes that the “bivariate impact of income has been ‘picked up’ in part by 
contraband and sons-of-the-soil dynamics,” which not only lead to significantly longer civil wars 
but also are found in poor countries (Fearon 2004, 287). While this observation is valid, it is 
difficult to determine how much effect each variable has on duration. Given Fearon’s lack of 
empirical support for this theory, it can be reasonably asserted for now that per capita income 
does have an effect on civil war duration.  
 Social factors, namely the composition of society, have also been found to directly affect 
the duration of conflict. The measure of ethnic diversity within a country has been immensely 
studied, and is strongly correlated with conflict duration. Ethnic fractionalization is most 
commonly measured on a scale of 0 to 100 in which 0 marks complete homogeneity and in 
which 100 marks complete heterogeneity. The ethnic diversity within a country is determined by 
the “probability that two randomly drawn individuals do not belong to the same group” (Collier 
et al. 2004, 262-263). Studies have found that duration is at its maximum when a country has two 
or three large ethnic groups, and an ethnic fractionalization of 50 (Collier et al. 2004, 263). Two 
or three large ethnic groups increase the level of social cohesion on the side of the rebels, 
essentially creating two sides; all those against the government will side with the rebels thus 
creating larger capacity on the side of the rebels. More than three large ethnic groups reduces 
social cohesion on the side of the rebels effectively lessening the ability of the rebels to launch a 
successful campaign against the government. An ethnic fractionalization of 50, perfect 
heterogeneity, is often associated with long civil wars. These conflicts last on average 84 
months. This is in comparison to “59 months if the fractionalization score is 25, and to 70 
months if the fractionalization score is 75” (Collier et al. 2004, 263).  
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 Fearon has also examined ethnic fractionalization and found that it is correlated with 
longer civil wars. He, however, hypothesized a different reason as to why. Fearon found that 
ethnic fractionalization alone might not have as significant an effect as previous authors have 
thought. While he does acknowledge ethnic diversity is seen to be associated with longer civil 
wars, he also states that countries that are ethnically diverse, having a fractionalization number of 
50, are also highly correlated with long-lasting peripheral insurgencies. Thus, he hypothesizes 
the second variable of peripheral insurgencies might be more significantly associated with long-
lasting wars (Fearon 2004, 287). Similarly, he found that more “homogeneous countries…have 
been more likely to have the brief civil wars that emerge from coups or revolutions,” so the 
brevity of the conflict may be more because of the type of war – coup or revolution – and less 
because of the ethnic homogeneity (Fearon 2004, 287).  
 In addition to the composition of society, population size is said to also have an effect on 
civil war duration, however the magnitude of the effect is questionable. Studies have found that 
on average more populous countries have longer civil wars; that “doubling the population 
increase the duration of conflict by 18%” (Collier et al. 2004, 263). This assertion however is 
misleading, and needs to be examined with caution. The fact that more populous countries tend 
to have longer civil wars is not the same as saying one particular rebellion lasts for longer in 
more populous countries. More populous countries, given the larger number of citizens, tend to 
have more rebellions, and thus since “a conflict is coded as continuing if any rebellion is 
continuing,” multiple separate rebellions may be coded as one rebellion and one civil war 
(Collier et al. 2004, 263). Whereas in a smaller country, where there are less people, there will be 
fewer rebellions and thus less of a chance that multiple separate rebellions will be coded as a 
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long-lasting civil war.  Another possible problem with this finding is that Collier et al. never 
define how many people are needed to constitute a populous country.  
 Geographic influences of civil war duration have also been abundantly studied and it has 
been found that ‘sons of the soil’ wars greatly affect the duration of a conflict. A ‘sons of the 
soil’ war is a type of intrastate war described as involving a land conflict between a peripheral 
ethnic minority and the state supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group (Fearon 2004, 275).  
The ethnic minority, as a result of losing land and being oppressed, support insurgencies against 
the state and the state-supported migrants. Of the 128 civil wars coded by Fearon, 21 are 
described as sons of the soil wars, and 12 were fought in Asia (Fearon 2004, 283). These wars 
are estimated to be relatively longer than other wars. The average duration for these sons of soil 
cases is 33.7 years compared to 8.5 years for the rest of the civil wars between 1945 and 1999 
(Fearon 2004, 283).  It has also been found that rough terrain increases the duration of conflicts, 
as if a rebel or guerrilla group is located in the more difficult to access areas, government forces 
will have a more difficult time projecting power, as mountainous terrains can offer good 
defensive and strategic positions (Buhaug et al. 2009, 547).   
 Similarly, it has been found that conflicts that occur far away from the state center last 
twice as long as those conflicts in which fighting occurs close to the state center (Buhaug et al. 
2009, 546).  Logic behind this is that government forces have a disadvantage if they have to 
operate over long distances, and are more difficult for the government to project their power 
(Buhaug et al. 2009, 550). Other disadvantages include: “physical barriers for transportation of 
troops and equipment…higher costs associated with longer distance, limited knowledge of the 
local environment, and…lack of support from the local population” (Buhaug et al. 2009, 550).  
Operating over long distances effectively lessen the advantage the government in terms of 
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military power, giving the rebels, who are most often the militarily weaker side, a clear 
advantage, which thus increase the conflict period. 
 In terms of political factors that affect the duration of a civil war coups and popular 
revolutions are correlated with short civil wars. Short is a relative term, however, but in this case 
short refers to duration below the average for civil wars, which is around 8.8 years (Fearon 2004, 
280). A coup-related war is defined as “a civil war between groups that aim to take control of a 
state, and that are led by individuals who were recently members of a state’s central government” 
(Fearon 2004, 280).  A popular revolution is often defined as a civil war that it sparked by mass 
demonstrations in favor of ousting a regime currently in power (Fearon 2004, 280). Average 
durations for these types of civil wars are well below the average. The mean war duration for 
coups and revolutions is only at 3 years. From comparison it can be seen that there is a strong 
correlation between coups and popular revolutions and a shorter duration of conflict.  
 Table 2: Summary of Existing Explanations of Civil War Duration 
 
Causal Variable 
 
Expected Effect 
Contraband 
 
Trade in contraband increases the duration of civil wars 
(for various reasons) 
 
Price of commodities 
 
Decreases in the price of primary commodity exports will 
shorten the length of civil wars 
 
Wealth (income per capita) Higher initial per capita incomes will shorten the length of 
civil wars, and lower per capita incomes will lengthen the 
conflict. *The direct relationship is debated. 
Ethnic Fractionalization More diverse societies will have longer civil war duration 
Population Size The larger the population size the longer the conflict is 
expected to last 
 
Land conflict: “Sons of the Soil” 
Will lengthen the civil war 
Rough Terrain The greater the degree of rough terrain the longer the civil 
war will last 
 
Location of conflict 
An increase in distance from the state center will increase 
the duration 
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Coups/ Popular Revolutions Correlated with shorter than average civil wars 
 
 External Intervention and Civil War Duration 
 Policymakers have little influence on these domestic factors of duration, but we should 
consider whether and what the UN can do to alter the initial predisposition of states to engage in 
shorter or longer conflicts. With the increase in the number of United Nations intervention and 
peacekeeping operations, there has been a renewed interest in examining the effects of these 
operations on civil war duration, and civil war in general. Within civil war literature there are 
two sides in the debate on the effect of UN intervention in civil war; those that agree UN 
intervention does affect the duration of a conflict, and those that argue it has no causal effect on 
conflict duration. Those that argue UN intervention is a major determinant of civil war duration, 
however, tend to be divided on whether this effect is beneficial for peace or leads to a longer 
duration of conflict. Central to studies on external intervention is the assumption that “outside 
interventions into internal conflicts are a form of conflict management and therefore attempt to 
control the hostilities rather than exacerbate them;” that the main goal of outside intervention is 
to reduce the duration of a conflict (Regan 2002, 59).   Most authors analyze duration as 
depending “critically on the balance of military capability between the government and the 
rebels” (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 1). There are many hypotheses on the relationship 
between intervention by international organizations and the duration of a conflict. Patrick Regan, 
a preeminent scholar on the topic, has found that interventions “carried out under the auspices of 
international organizations have no independent effect on the expected time until a conflict ends” 
(Regan 2002, 72). No independent effect, however, in this case is not synonymous with 
decreased or increased duration; it simply means there is a lack of empirical support. This lack of 
support, as Regan hypothesizes, may stem from the fact that 45% of interventions by 
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international organizations are not impartial. Thus, it is more accurate to analyze these 
interventions by international organizations as analogous to unilateral interventions (Regan 2002, 
72). Therefore, Regan’s results on unilateral interventions in favor of one side in a conflict are 
also relevant to the question at hand. 
 In regards to unilateral external intervention and civil wars it is generally argued that 
overall most interventions increase the duration of a conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis, who 
define external intervention as: “a unilateral intervention by one (or more) third party 
government(s) in a civil war in the form of military, economic or mixed assistance in favor of 
either the government or the rebel movement involved in a civil war,” find that external 
interventions are positively and highly associated with war duration (Elbadawi and Sambanis 
2000, 8). Even though they found that external interventions lead to longer conflicts, they 
explicitly stated that this “evidence does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. It may be 
the case that causality runs in the opposite direction and interventions may occur only in wars 
that are already long lasting” (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 12).  
 In “Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts” Regan largely 
agreed with previous studies, in that he hypothesized interventions specifically in support of the 
government early in a conflict will shorten the expected duration of a conflict (Regan 2002, 62).  
Being that a civil war is most simply described as a conflict between a government and a rebel 
group with relatively less military power, it would logically follow that if a third-party intervenes 
on the side of the government that has more military might, then the duration of a civil conflict 
would shorten. Thus, also it would be assumed that if a third-party intervened on the side of the 
opposition early in a conflict then the expected duration of a conflict would be longer, because 
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the third-party is altering the balance of capabilities by making both sides more equal in terms 
military power.  
 Interestingly, Regan also hypothesizes that neutral intervention will lead to shorter 
expected duration than interventions that support one side over the other.  He argues this to be 
the case because in theory these interventions are more likely to “distribute resources in a 
manner that increases equality” (Regan 2002, 64). While Regan found that intervention in 
support of the government does not lead to a shorter duration, he found overwhelming support 
that intervention on average tends to increase the expected duration of a civil war (Regan 
2002,71).   
 Recent research into the relationship between expected duration of a conflict and external 
intervention has broken down external intervention into varying components. Instead of broadly 
asserting that external intervention leads to increased duration of conflict, this new research 
states that only certain kinds of interventions increase the duration of a conflict, while some 
types actually decrease the expected duration. Intervention largely comprises two types: those 
that attempt to change the relationship between governments and rebel movements, and those 
that attempt to “manipulate the information that these actors hold” (Regan and Aydin 2006, 738).  
Diplomatic interventions are found to dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict by 
reducing the “asymmetry of information about capabilities and incentives” (Regan and Aydin 
2006, 741). In these interventions third-parties act as intermediaries between warring parties to 
reveal information in a credible way. Diplomatic interventions are largely successful in reducing 
the expected length of a conflict because it helps “warring factions overcome commitment 
problems” (Gilligan and Sergenti 2007, 6). The criticism in regards to this finding is that 
diplomatic intervention requires voluntary agreement by all parties, thus all parties may 
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potentially already be open to negotiation, and therefore the civil war would already be coming 
to an end not because of the intervention.  Interestingly, while accounting for the lingering 
effects of interventions over time, Regan and Aydin find that neither “economic nor military 
forms of intervention have any statistically significant impact on expected duration” (Regan and 
Aydin 2006, 748).  
 Most previous work on the effect of UN intervention on the duration of civil war gives a 
general answer that supposedly applies to all civil war cases. It is important, however, to 
determine the effect of UN intervention by examining it in light of the expected duration of a 
conflict. The argument for this project adds to previous civil war literature by focusing on the 
effect of UN intervention specifically in regards to the anticipated duration of a conflict. 
Additionally, rather than assuming all UN peacekeeping interventions to be the same, as 
previous research has done, this project aims to break the variable of UN intervention into 
various subcategories and determine their distinct effect on the duration of a civil conflict.  
 
Theory 
 Does United Nations intervention, in the form of peacekeeping operations and Security 
Council Resolutions, increase the duration of an active civil conflict, help bring peace, or have 
no independent effect? Much civil war literature on the effect of UN intervention on the duration 
of civil war states that intervention does have an effect on duration, either positive or negative. 
As a result of the UN claiming peacekeeping to be a solution to the commitment and 
informational problems associated with civil war, one would expect to see UN intervention 
decrease the duration of civil wars. At first glance one may associate those peacekeeping 
missions that were deemed successes to decrease the duration of conflict and those that were 
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deemed failures to increase the duration of conflict. These assumptions, however, are not entirely 
founded as those successful missions may have been in wars that were expected to be shorter 
anyways. Thus, in order to determine if the mission was truly a success one would have to 
determine the expected duration of the conflict and see if or how the UN intervention decreased 
the expected duration. Similarly, those mission failures may not have fully ended the conflict, 
but in order to determine if a mission was indeed a failure, in that they did not have any effect on 
the conflict’s duration, one would have to first identify the factors robustly associated with the 
conflict’s duration and determine if the UN altered the relationship between the factors and the 
conflict.   
 Utilizing this logic one can deduce that the UN may not have a significant effect in 
altering the anticipated duration as other factors may make the UN’s effect on duration obsolete. 
Previous studies on the subject on UN intervention and civil war length leave opportunities for 
more research, as most do not question the direct correlation between external intervention and 
conflict duration. In contrast to previous works (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002; 
Regan and Aydin 2006; Gilligan and Sergenti 2007), I argue that the effectiveness of UN 
intervention decreases with a greater expected duration. Thus, in those civil wars that are 
expected to last much longer than the average, UN intervention would have a minimal effect on 
ending the conflict. This is because when a conflict is expected to last relatively long, the 
relationships between domestic factors of duration and the conflict are robust; the relationships 
are stronger than the effect of UN intervention. 
 As seen from Table 1, the data shows that the UN intervenes in those civil wars that 
typically last longer than the average civil war. One can thus make the assertion that the UN 
intervenes in the more difficult to resolve cases, those that are expected to last longer.  This 
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assertion therefore leads to the main question of this paper: does UN intervention have a 
significant impact on an intrastate war’s duration or do other factors that determine a wars 
expected duration have a more direct significance and correlation with conflict duration? Based 
on existing research, I argue that we should expect the following: 1) UN intervention is more 
effective in less severe conflicts, 2) UN Observer Missions are much less effective than UN 
Missions and Operations, and 3) UN intervention is more effective when the Permanent Five 
members of the Security Council have greater interests with the country at war. I address each of 
these hypotheses in turn. 
 Hypothesis 1: The effectiveness of UN intervention into active civil conflicts 
decreases with the greater the expected duration of the conflict.  
 The logic behind this hypothesis is that those civil wars characterized by longer expected 
durations of conflict will be less affected by UN interventions regardless of intervention timing 
because the interplay of factors associated with duration renders UN intervention less effective.  
Essentially, the direct relationship between UN intervention and conflict duration decreases with 
the greater the expected duration of a conflict based on domestic factors. Thus, civil wars that 
last much longer than the average civil war have more factors that are strongly associated with a 
conflict’s duration, and as a result of this, the UN’s effectiveness and influence on a conflict’s 
duration decreases. Essentially, an increase in the expected length of a conflict based on 
domestic factors decreases the effectiveness of the UN; the relationship between UN intervention 
and civil war duration becomes less direct with the longer an expected duration.  
 Simply examining numerical data however is not sufficient enough to explain the basis 
for this hypothesis. Previous scholars have proposed the aforementioned situation, in which a 
variable’s supposed effect on an outcome is actually the by-product of other, more robust 
 22 
 
variables, for factors such as initial per capita income and ethnic fractionalization. This theory, 
however, has not been examined in regards to external intervention. The fact that scholars have 
left opportunities to examine this relationship is interesting not only because the situation has 
been examined with other variables, but also because it has been studied and found in other 
datasets that UN peacekeepers are more likely to intervene in conflicts that are believed to be 
more difficult to end (Gilligan and Stedman 2003).   
 A main focus of this study is the fact that when domestic factors make civil war likely to 
be much longer than average, there is not much the UN can do to mitigate conflict and bring 
about peace. UN intervention is not robustly correlated with civil war duration when a conflict is 
expected to last much longer than average. However, a main point of this hypothesis is that UN 
intervention can be directly correlated with decreasing the duration of a civil war if the conflict is 
expected to be short. I will determine the expected durations of each conflict used for this study 
relative to one another. As this study will not be undergoing large statistical analysis, the 
question of how to determine which variables are most important in a conflict is crucial. A factor 
is important to the duration if it plays a large role in fueling the continued fighting. Only those 
factors that are strongly correlated with altering a conflict’s duration will be considered. For 
instance, a country may have rough terrain in one region of the country, but if fighting was not 
concentrated in this area, then this factor will not be important in determining the conflict’s 
expected duration. Therefore this study will not attribute variables such as these to altering a 
conflict’s expected duration.  
 While the basis for this hypothesis comes from trends observed among the UCDP dataset, 
the expected durations attributed to the specific cases used to analyze this hypothesis will be 
original to this project. The relative anticipated durations of the three conflicts will be based on 
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which factors within the respective countries most contributed to conflict duration (i.e. most 
robust). For example, in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Colombia, lootable resources (diamonds and 
drugs) played major roles in funding the continuation of fighting. However, the extent to which 
they effected continuation varies from case to case, as it is difficult not to measure the variable 
on a continuum. The anticipated duration will take into account all the variables within a country 
that are shown to effect the duration and the interplays between the variables.  
Hypothesis 2: UN Observer/Verification Missions, when deployed into active civil conflicts, 
are less effective than UN Missions/Operations in ending a conflict.  
 In light of this hypothesis, it is important to distinguish between the two general 
categories of UN peacekeeping previously mentioned. United Nations Observer/ Verification 
Missions and UN Missions/Operations fall into the general category of multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations, which are called upon “not only to maintain peace and security, but 
also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and 
promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law” (What Is Peacekeeping?). Upon 
examining the past and current UN peacekeeping operations, it is apparent that all UN missions 
do not all attempt to address each of the previously mentioned points; some operations are more 
actively involved in the conflict while other operations simply look on as observers. The 
terminology used in Observer/Verification Missions’ mandates is drastically different than other 
peacekeeping operations. Observer Missions tend to be composed of less than 1,000 personnel, 
some less than even 100 personnel, with few to any casualties. These missions tend to verify 
peace arrangements agreed upon by all parties, monitor and implement ceasefires, observe and 
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verify elections, and monitor the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. As their title 
suggests, they essentially observe the state of affairs within a country.   
 In contrast, UN Missions/Operations tend to be relatively more actively involved in 
assisting the ending of a civil war; they are a more serious commitment to being involved.  These 
peacekeeping operations on average have more than 1,000 troops, with many missions having 
upwards of 10,000 personnel (Howard 2008). As a result of these missions being more actively 
involved in the civil wars they intervene in, casualties are higher. The UN Mission in Sierra 
Leone had a maximum strength of approximately 18,000 personnel and 192 casualties, both 
numbers much higher than observer or verification missions. Whereas observer and verification 
missions are mainly involved in overlooking and monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements, 
UN missions and operations actively assist in the disarmament and the demobilization of troops, 
and are often told to establish a presence at key locations throughout the country in which they 
are deployed. While these missions also, for example, provide support to elections, it is apparent 
through looking at their mandates that their main goal is to help end fighting and bring about 
peace. 
 The basis for this hypothesis comes from examining the multitude of post-Cold War UN 
peacekeeping cases. The majority of the cases fall into two general subcategories: UN Observer/ 
Verification Missions and UN Missions/Operations. Upon first glance, one may assume all UN 
interventions are equally effective, as many civil wars end shortly after UN intervention. To 
assume this, however, is wrong as many of these conflicts are already coming to an end, with 
ceasefire or peace agreements being signed once the UN intervenes. Therefore, in order to 
analyze this hypothesis this project will examine how each of these two categories of UN 
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peacekeeping dealt with the factors that were most determinant in prolonging the conflict, and 
how long fighting lasted once the UN intervened. 
 Simply through a brief analysis of the cases used for this study (Angola, Colombia, and 
Sierra Leone), one can see that all the UN peacekeeping operations deployed to Angola during 
the two decade long civil war were UN Verification and Observer Missions. At first glance it 
seems as though the missions in Angola were not effective in decreasing the duration of the 
conflict or in ending the conflict, as the civil war did not end during any of the missions but 
rather years after the UN had withdrawn from the country. In order to fully analyze this 
hypothesis in regard to Angola, it will be important to examine the degree of severity during the 
years in which the UN was present in the country; did the missions lead to a decreased severity 
or did actions not associated with the UN missions help bring about peace? One can also analyze 
this hypothesis by looking at how the UN mission dealt with the variables of the conflict that 
were most robust in effecting the conflict’s duration. 
 The UN peacekeeping operations deployed to Sierra Leone in the midst of the conflict 
also shows that UN Observer Missions may not be very determinant in altering a conflict’s 
duration. The UN Observer Mission deployed to Sierra Leone in July of 1998, which monitored 
the military and security situation in Sierra Leone was ended in October of 1999 and quickly 
replaced with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. In order to determine the effect of Observer 
Missions and UN Missions/ Operations on the duration of a conflict, a similar approach as that of 
Angola will be used.  
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Hypothesis 3: UN peacekeeping interventions will be most effective in ending those civil 
conflicts in which the interest of the war to the Permanent Five in the Security Council is 
highest.  
  The Security Council consists of fifteen total countries; it includes five permanent 
members (The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), while the ten 
remaining seats in the Security Council are rotating positions, which always include members 
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 9).  An intervention’s 
approval requires “the affirmative vote of nine states, including no negative votes from the five 
permanent members (the P5) and four positive votes from the ten elected members” (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006, 9). This hypothesis assumes the Permanent 5 would most often vote negative on 
those interventions in which the wars do not or will not have a significant effect on their country, 
and thus the Permanent 5 would vote approvingly or be indifferent to those interventions in 
countries that they are heavily invested in or those that could indirectly effect the state of affairs 
in their own country.  
 While other studies have examined the question of whether UN involvement in civil wars 
is strategic, meaning the UN intervenes in those conflicts that are expected to be more 
manageable, or benevolent in nature, my hypothesis is based on the found trend previously 
established that the UN intervenes in those conflicts that last longer than the average civil war, 
and thus are typically less manageable. Seeing as such the UN does not intervene most often in 
the wars that last the shortest, one can conclude the UN may not be basing their decision on 
which conflicts are less or more manageable. If the UN were basing their decision to intervene 
on this, one would expect the UN to intervene in the conflicts that are anticipated to be brief, 
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however the average duration of conflicts that the UN has intervened in is greater than the total 
average.  
 As funding is a major part of any UN mission, as it is required in order to be successful, 
one can assume that the UN would not want to spend a considerable amount of money on a 
conflict that is expected, based on domestic factors, to last much longer than average. Utilizing 
this reasoning, it would follow that the UN may intervene in civil wars that are anticipated to last 
longer because of the invested interest of the Permanent 5.  Thus, as previously stated, this 
project hypothesizes that in those conflicts that are expected to last longer than average, the 
decision to intervene is based on the interest of the conflict in the eyes of the Permanent 5. These 
interventions would also be more effective at ending conflict as more funding, troops, and 
attention would be given to that mission as a result of the higher interests of the conflicts to the 
main actors in the Security Council.            
 My theory differs from existing explanations in that it argues the relationship between 
UN intervention and civil war duration is not strictly a direct relationship; the direct correlation 
between UN intervention and civil war duration changes with the anticipated duration of a 
conflict. Existing explanations assert that either intervention has a positive or negative effect; 
they do not consider that the effect might be on a continuum in which the effectiveness of UN 
intervention decreases with the longer expected duration of a conflict. Additionally, my theory 
adds to existing research on the effect of UN intervention of civil war duration as it differentiates 
between types of intervention. Most previous work does not differentiate between types, 
however it is important to do so as the each type of UN interventions plays a distinct role in 
conflict duration.  
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Methodology  
 In light of the proposed theory, it is necessary to define what this study deems a civil war. 
Academically, civil war often is defined differently than the United Nations, or other 
international organizations, would define a civil war. Some UN interventions may have gone into 
a country they viewed as a civil war, but one that does not meet the academic requirements.  
Much disagreement exists within the academic community in regards to a proper definition of an 
intrastate war. Civil war lists in the past relied heavily on the Correlates of War database to code 
civil conflicts, however, in recent years with advancements in civil war studies, scholars have 
increasingly created their own lists due to questionable coding rules for the Correlates of War 
project and other similar projects. While it has been mentioned that differing definitions of civil 
war may cause skewed results, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the academic community to 
agree on a single definition of civil war. Therefore, this project will rely on UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset 2010, as its civil war definition and lists are similar to many other 
definitions (Singer & Small, 1994; IISS, 2000;Licklider, 1995; Sivard, 1996; Doyle & Sambanis, 
2000; Etsy el al., 1998; Gleditsch el al., 2002; Valentino, 2002), and have strict coding rules. The 
Uppsala program defines an intrastate-armed conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least on is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one 
calendar year” (Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Definitions). Even though the 
threshold number of battle deaths for this definition is rather low, at only 25 as opposed to other 
definitions, which use 100 or 1,000, this data set is still appropriate as it is commonly used 
within the academic community. This dataset, produced by Uppsala Conflict Data Program, is 
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ideal as it is very well documented and accurate as many conflict are coded to the specific date in 
which fighting began and ended.  
 A problem, however, with this dataset is that it assumes the civil war ends when the 
killing ends. The Uppsala Conflict Termination Dataset, while reliable and accurate, seems to 
divide many conflicts into multiple separate conflicts even though the same actors are fighting 
and the same intent behind the fighting is present. As Fearon and other scholars have stated, it is 
misleading to code a civil war as ending simply when the killing ends as there simply may be a 
lull in fighting due to factions re-grouping in order to launch another campaign. Consequently, 
this project will draw on Fearon’s criteria on how to code the end dates, as it does not assume 
that a war ends when the killing ends.  The civil war list used specifically for this project will 
code a civil war as continuous if a victory, peace agreement, ceasefire, or low activity is not 
followed by at least three years of peace. Requiring three years of peace is sufficient as it allows 
time for a lull in fighting if rebel groups or the government are simply attempting to re-group in 
order to launch another attack. Additionally, this project’s dataset will end in 2009 and thus those 
wars that in 2009 were still ongoing will be given 2009 as a tentative end date. Ending the 
dataset in this year is appropriate as any later date would not be sufficient under the definition for 
what determines an end date, as at least three years of peace must be observed.  
 The Uppsala data set and original coding serve as the basis for this project, however 
Fearon’s data set version 2004 will also be utilized, as it is a comprehensive civil war data set 
that includes all civil wars from 1945 to 1999. This data set is not solely used for the purposes of 
this project because it only codes those civil conflicts up until 1999.  This project will not use 
Fearon’s years of duration for each conflict, however this data set is useful as it codes the 
expected duration of a conflict and also because it includes variables on contraband financing, 
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ethnicity, and geography, which will be important for the theory and analysis portions of this 
project.  
 In order to analyze this proposed hypothesis, a most similar comparative case study is 
employed. Two of the three cases (Angola and Colombia) are similar in terms of aspects that are 
largely accepted within the academic community to affect the duration of a civil conflict. The 
cases differ, however, on the variable of external intervention. Both countries chosen are similar 
in terms of the amount of factors of duration present and the composition of those factors, thus 
each country will have a similar expected duration of conflict. Given the diversity among civil 
war cases, it is impractical to expect to match these two cases on every factor of duration and 
characteristic of the conflict. As no two cases of civil war are exactly alike and since the factors 
in which the countries differ may have an unprecedented effect on civil war duration, this project 
will have limitations but will nonetheless offer an important contribution to our understanding of 
civil war duration.  The third case study (Sierra Leone) used in this study will have been the 
recipient of UN intervention and will have some similar aspects to the previous two civil wars, 
however the expected duration of this war will be shorter than the other two. Thus, this will help 
determine if the effectiveness of the UN in civil wars with varying degrees of expected durations. 
Comparing countries that have experienced UN intervention, and one that has not been the target 
of intervention effectively isolates the effect of external intervention, making the effect on the 
length of the conflict apparent.  
 As previously discussed, this research project will employ a case study approach to 
examining the effect of United Nations intervention on the duration of civil war. An inherent 
problem however with utilizing a case study approach to answer the proposed question is that 
this method makes it harder to come to a generalizable conclusion. Utilizing case study 
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approaches are sufficient as they can provide the basis for future research and maximize what 
can be learned in a short amount of time. Although this research does employ a case study 
approach, the specific cases used span regions, reasons and origins of war, and follow very 
different courses throughout the war, thus this conclusion can apply to many different cases of 
civil conflict. Additionally, as this project aims to analyze how UN peacekeeping interventions 
affect the duration of a conflict, a case study approach is ideal because analyzing wars 
quantitatively cannot take into account an underlying and not readily apparent effect of an 
internal variable on a conflict’s duration.  For example, many quantitative studies have found 
initial per capita income to be minimally correlated with conflict duration. For many conflicts, 
however, a low per capita income at the start of fighting may be highly correlated with continued 
fighting, as one reason for the civil war starting was economic decline or stagnation. 
Qualitatively analyzing case studies in this regard is ideal because it takes into account complex 
relationships between the factors of the conflict and the duration.  
 Angola, Sierra Leone, and Colombia are appropriate and useful cases for answering the 
proposed hypotheses because, firstly, Angola has been the recipient of much UN intervention 
during the almost three-decade long civil war. The UN launched four missions in Angola in 
order to attempt to establish peace in the country. The first mission, which began in early 1989 
and lasted until mid-1991, entitled United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, was 
established to verify the phased and total withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops in 
Angola (Howard 2008). Upon successful completion of the mandate, the Security Council issued 
the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II in order to verify the arrangements agreed on 
by the government of Angola and UNITA during the 1991 Angolan Peace Accords. This mission 
also monitored the ceasefire and the Angolan police during the ceasefire and was also called 
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upon to observe and verify elections (Howard 2008). The mission which was established in mid 
1991 and lasted until early 1995 was also in charge of overseeing the initial stages of the Lusaka 
Protocol signed by the government of Angola and UNITA on November 20, 1994. The third 
mission to Angola, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, was established in 
February of 1995 to help the government of Angola and UNITA restore peace, however the 
mission failed and the United Nations withdrew in June of 1997 (Howard 2008).  The fourth and 
final mission was that of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, which was established 
in 1997 and lasted until 1999. Its main goal was to assist Angola in consolidating peace and to 
create and environment conducive to long-term peace and stability. This mission was terminated 
in 1999 when fighting between UNITA and the government became more intense (Howard 
2008).  
 Sierra Leone is also an appropriate case for this study as it too has been the recipient of a 
large amount of UN peacekeeping. UN intervention in Sierra Leone is similar to that of Angola 
in which there was an Observer Mission, however it differs in that there was also a United 
Nations Mission. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) began in July 1998 
towards the end of the conflict and continued until October 1999. This peacekeeping force was 
delegated to monitor the military and security situation in the country while also monitoring the 
disarmament of former combatants. The civilian element of UNOMSIL was expected to advise 
the Government of Sierra Leone on matters such as police training and the “need to respect 
internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies” (“UNOMSIL”).  Upon 
reigniting of the conflict UNOMSIL was replace with the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL) which began in October 1999 and continued until December 2005. This 
mission, as stated by its mandate, was actively involved in the civil war as they were expected to 
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assist the government in the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, and, among other, 
to provide security at important locations throughout the capital of Freetown and at all sites of 
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programme (“UNAMSIL: The United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone-Mandate”). 
 Colombia, in contrast, has not been the recipient of any UN peacekeeping intervention. 
The civil war in Colombia is an appropriate case study for this project because comparing cases 
which had different forms of UN intervention with a case that saw no UN intervention 
effectively isolates that variable, allowing one to determine the effect of that intervention on 
similar civil conflicts. Even though these cases will help to answer the proposed question, 
criticism in regards to the choice of the specific cases is expected for three reasons: all cases are 
not of the same region, one case is still ongoing, and two of the cases started in the Cold War 
period while the other did not. These concerns, while valid, will not affect the legitimacy of the 
study.  Firstly, examining countries that are not all located in the same region is beneficial for 
this study. An inherent problem with case study approaches is that a generalizable conclusion is 
difficult to make. The challenge of a generalizable conclusion is less of a concern here because 
of the breadth of cases.  
 
Analysis 
 Cases 
 With the increase of UN peacekeeping operations and Security Council Resolutions 
concerning civil wars in the post-Cold War era, there are many potential case studies. As of 2008 
there had been thirty-five post-Cold War operations, including but not limited to: Namibia, 
Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia (Howard 2008, 4).  Since the 
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end of the Cold War in 1989 the Security Council has also steadily increased their influence in 
civil wars. Throughout the 1980s the average number of resolutions passed by the Security 
Council were around 20 per year. In 1990, only one year after the end of the Cold War, this 
number increased to 37, and since then has steadily increased with upwards of 60 resolutions 
passed in 2011. (“Security Council: Resolutions”). 
 Sierra Leone 
  Background Information 
 The civil war in Sierra Leone, which lasted from 1991 until 2000, was one of the most 
well-known civil wars of recent years as it was infamous for conflict diamonds, child soldiers, 
and wide spread mutilations and amputations imposed upon the public by the main rebel group 
the Revolutionary United Front.  The end date of the civil war in Sierra Leone is debated, with 
some databases claiming the war lasted until 2002. In late 2000 after the Peace Accord, however, 
fatalities decreased to the point where, according to the definition used for this study, the conflict 
could no longer be coded as an intrastate conflict. The civil war claimed approximately 20,000 to 
75,000 lives and displaced 2.1 million, which at the time was almost half the country’s 
population (Davies 2000, 350).  
 In 1961 Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain and appeared to be on a 
prosperous path as it had one of the most highly developed educational systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The economy was growing at an annual rate of 4 percent between 1965 and 1973, and, 
among others, primary school attendance had doubled between 1961 and 1973. State failure, 
however, soon resulted (Chege 2002, 151; Davies 2000, 349). The first to lead Sierra Leone on a 
path of self-destruction was that of President Siaka Stevens who ruled the country from 1968 to 
1985. He pursued “slow-motion, self-destructive policies,” such as render the once productive 
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parliament powerless, and ban all opposition parties. The gross economic mismanagement, 
which resulted in economic decline, high unemployment rates, and high levels of poverty, led to 
grievances most notably among the youth and therefore is largely regarded to be a major cause of 
the civil war (Davies 2000, 351).  
 In 1985 Stevens handed leadership of Sierra Leone over to Momoh, a former military 
general who was even more inept at governing state affairs. As the government continued to 
ignore the needs of its people, the public began to view the government as illegitimate (Chege 
2002, 153).  While the government’s mismanagement of the entire state system established 
grievances among the general population, these grievances alone were not enough to launch the 
country into civil war; there was no opportunity or means to fund a civil war. This opportunity 
however came in 1991. With support from Liberian and Burkinabe fighters from Charles 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia and financial support from Libya, the rebel group 
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was able to launch a full-scale rebellion. The RUF first 
attacked those rural towns located near the Liberian border, and as a result of the inept handling 
of the government and the lack of legitimacy the government had throughout the country, the 
RUF found many willing recruits (Davies 2000, 358).  However, as the civil war ensued the RUF 
was no longer perceived as a favorable force to overthrow the government, but rather as a 
malicious rebel group. Widespread atrocities, such as conscripting children to fight, and using 
women and children as human shields were reported throughout the course of the civil war. 
 The civil conflict was largely funded and fueled by ‘conflict’ diamonds. Diamond mining 
in Sierra Leone was a major factor in prolonging fighting, as it “requires no heavy machinery or 
technology, since these alluvial stones sit close to the surface in dried riverbeds,” and thus is 
relatively easy for any armed group to use as a source of financial support (Bellows and Miguel 
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2008, 5). Diamonds produced a “war-prolonging congruence of interest among the war 
protagonists – the rebels and allied neighbouring countries, the army and other pro-government 
forces, and sometimes the government itself” (Davies 2000, 359).  Even though all parties 
involved in the war utilized contraband as a source of funding at some point, the RUF were the 
most devoted and dependent on this source of funding. For instance, in 2000 the RUF controlled 
approximately 90% of Sierra Leone’s diamond mining regions (Davies 2000, 359). Often, the 
RUF would exchange diamonds with President Taylor of Liberia for weapons, cross border 
sanctuary and mercenaries, which greatly prolonged the civil conflict (Davies 2000, 359).  
 Additionally, the Sierra Leone conflict was heavily internationalized, with interventions 
from not only the United Nations but also from ECOMOG, and the mercenary group Executive 
Outcomes. The search for peace was also instigated by the international community with 
ECOWAS, the UN, Commonwealth, OAU, the UK, and the USA playing large roles on the 
establishment of various peace accords, such as the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996, the Conakry 
Peace Plan of 1997 and the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999. While the first two accords were 
largely unsuccessful, the Lomé Peace Accord as a power sharing agreement had more promise. 
The accord’s intended goal was peace, it called for amnesty of all rebels, “power sharing 
between the government and the rebels, transformation of the RUF into a political party and for 
its leader, Foday Sankoh, to enjoy the status of vice president and chairman of the Commission 
for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development” (Davies 
2000, 364).  
 Even though all parties signed the peace agreement, fighting continued. The Peace 
Accord completely fell apart in May 2000 when the RUF kidnapped 500 UN peacekeepers and 
killed protestors in the capital of Freetown. The final ceasefire came on 10 November 2000 with 
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the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone agreeing to observe a ceasefire and halt all 
hostilities. It also called for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to actively assist in 
implementing the ceasefire and the demobilization of the fighters (Binningsbo and Dupuy 2009, 
4). This ceasefire was successful in restoring peace to the country, effectively ending the civil 
war in Sierra Leone. 
 Expected Duration (Sierra Leone) 
 In terms of effecting the expected duration of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the following 
factors had the greatest effect: valuable contraband funding, geography, initial per capita income, 
and non-UN external intervention. It is important to note that these factors are simply those that 
are most heavily correlated with influencing the duration of the Sierra Leonean civil war. Those 
factors that had a minimal effect on the conflict’s duration will not be analyzed, as identifying 
this small effect is beyond the scope necessary for this project. When determining the effect 
contraband has in the duration of a civil war, there is not a strict degree in which to determine the 
effect, rather one should think of the effect of contraband as a continuum, where these lootable 
resources more heavily affect some wars. The case of Sierra Leone is one in which diamonds 
played the largest role in increasing the duration as the war was always closely connected to the 
competition for resources. 
 The diamonds in Sierra Leone are mainly secondary or alluvial, meaning they are easily 
extracted from riverbeds, with most diamond mines being located close to the border with 
Liberia. It is important to determine how these diamonds were used to affect the civil war, as 
different usages can effect duration differently. As previously stated, illegal diamond trading can 
alter the duration of a civil war in various ways: increasing the funds available to purchase 
weapons, reduce incentives for a peaceful settlement as aim is profit oriented, and increase the 
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ease of rebel recruitment. Through examining the war in Sierra Leone, it is apparent that the 
main actor in the conflict, the RUF, traded diamonds with neighboring Liberia in exchange for 
weapons in order to promote instability and recruit rebels. A few years after the war began, in 
1992, the RUF infiltrated the Kono district of Sierra Leone, and soon they were controlling 90% 
of the country’s diamond producing regions rich in alluvial diamonds, and thus easily lootable 
(Davies 2000, 366). Soon after the procurement of the Kono district, the RUF fueled their 
conflict by trading diamonds for weapons with Liberia, and to a lesser extent, Cote d’Ivoire 
(Silberfein 2004, 223). Both Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire have few if any natural diamond 
endowments, however in 1997 Liberia “exported 5,803,000 carats of diamonds to Belgium while 
Cote d’Ivoire exported 885,000 carats” (Davies 2000, 359).  It is apparent that the increase is 
diamond exports in these countries was not due to an increase in the number of primary or 
secondary diamonds sites but rather due to illegal smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. 
There could be no other logical manner in which Liberia could go from, in 1988, exporting US 
$8.4 million worth of diamonds to in 1995 exporting US $500 million worth of diamonds when 
the Liberian economy was virtually non-existent in the aftermath of a brutal civil war (Davies 
2000, 359). Further evidence of diamonds militarily funding the RUF came from personal 
documents of the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, which displayed much evidence the RUF engaged 
in illegal diamond trading with Charles Taylor of Liberia. These documents testify to the large 
role Liberia, specifically Taylor, had in Sierra Leone’s destructive civil war.  
 As previously stated the relationship between diamonds funding arms purchase and rebel 
recruitment is debatable as some speculate it will increase the duration of civil war, while others 
speculate it will decrease the length. In regards to Sierra Leone, it strongly appears as though the 
diamonds mined to support the RUF were used mainly as a dependable means of finance to 
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secure weapons, and to increase the rebel recruitment rates. Even though the relationship 
between these variables is uncertain, this study asserts that the use of diamonds in the Sierra 
Leonean civil war actually made the war shorter than what is typically seen with contraband 
funded civil wars. Fearon (2004) coded the mean civil war duration for conflicts in which 
valuable contraband played a major role to be approximately forty-six years, which is much 
longer than the average civil war length, which he found to be approximately nine years. It is 
important to note that Fearon used a different definition to code for civil war, and thus his 
average durations differ from the dataset used for this study, however, the pattern that contraband 
funded civil wars last longer than other civil wars is a trend seen within most data sets including 
the one used for this study.  
 At first glance, one may assume that diamonds lengthened the civil war in Sierra Leone; 
this may have been the case if the RUF did not actively seek out government forces and engage 
in fighting. The fact that the RUF had a dependable means of finance capable of supporting a 
long-lasting insurgency could have meant the civil war in Sierra Leone could have played out 
similar to other cases in which contraband played a major role. However, this relationship 
actually altered the balance of power between the RUF and the government, leading the RUF to 
actively infiltrate regions close to the capital and to pursue the capital of Freetown. On many 
occasions, including the following, the RUF came close to taking Freetown: in 1998 the Kabbah 
government was almost successfully overthrown by the military in an alliance with the RUF, in 
early 1999 the Kabbah government almost lost control once again when the RUF invaded 
Freetown, and in May of 2000 the rebels came close, once again, to taking Freetown. It is 
apparent that much fighting between the RUF and the government occurred close to the capital. 
This study therefore finds that the illegally traded diamonds used by the RUF actually led to the 
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civil conflict in Sierra Leone to be shorter than many other contraband funded civil wars because 
the weapons gains by this trading were actually used by the RUF to fight with the government 
and to push closer to the capital of Sierra Leone and the government stronghold. The 
prolongation of the civil war may have been due to the fact that many times the RUF withdrew to 
the rural regions close to the border of Liberia in order to rearm and regroup. This logic brings 
the effect of geography on civil war duration into consideration.  
 As previously stated, a civil war in which fighting occurs close to the state center will 
typically be twice as short as wars in which fighting is concentrated in rural areas and the 
periphery. The weapons the RUF obtained from diamond trading allowed the RUF to push close 
to the state center, which may have off set the extreme prolonging effect of contraband financing 
on civil war duration. Apart from the location of the fighting in respect to the government 
stronghold, it does not seems as though any additional geographical factors had a major role in 
prolonging the conflict, as the absolute size of Sierra Leone is relatively small at 71,740 square 
kilometers, and while there are mountainous, and rough terrain, the fighting was not concentrated 
in these locations and thus could not have had a large effect on conflict duration.  
 While there is speculation from quantitative data results regarding initial per capita 
income and its influence on conflict duration, it is apparent that the economic instability and 
stagnation prior to and during the civil war in Sierra Leone had a great effect on the conflict’s 
duration. Data sets (Fearon 2004) have speculated that the lower the per capita income in the 
year prior to the war start date the longer a civil conflict will last as opportunity costs for going 
to war are rather low and conflict can be sustained for longer periods of time as losses are also 
low. In 1990, the year prior to the start date of the war, the GDP per capita (in current $US) was 
163. This is drastically lower than neighboring countries in the West African region, such as 
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Cote d’Ivoire, which in 1990 had a GDP per capita of 862, Guinea with a score of 463, and 
Guinea-Bissau with a score of 240 in 1990 (“GDP per capita”). Liberia, with a score of 181, had 
a similar GDP per capita as Sierra Leone, however this is most likely attributed to their own civil 
war that began in 1989, which negatively affected Liberia’s economy (“GDP per capita”). It is 
apparent that the relatively low per capita income in Sierra Leone in the year prior to the civil 
war start date led to a prolongation of the civil war as the opportunity costs for the people of 
Sierra Leone was very minimal.  Thus, the initial per capita income in Sierra Leone had a 
prolonging, but minimal, effect of the civil conflict.  
 An additional factor that played a large role in altering the duration of the civil conflict 
was that of the pro-government interventions of the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and Executive Outcomes.  ECOMOG is the military force 
of the organization ECOWAS which generally promotes cooperation among West African states.  
ECOMOG entered the Sierra Leonean civil war in 1997 when the then president, Ahmed Tejan 
Kabbah, was overthrown. In late 1997 when a peace treaty failed to reinstate Kabbah as 
president, ECOMOG launched a military campaign with the goal to return the elected 
government to power. With help from the Civil Defense Forces, ECOMOG was successful in 
pushing the rebels from Freetown and out of many key areas surrounding the capital. Even 
though ECOMOG was successful in restoring the Kabbah government, they did not have the 
military might or capacity to fully defeat the RUF. 
 In addition to ECOMOG, in mid-1995 the government of Sierra Leone contracted the 
private security firm, Executive Outcomes, to aid in fighting the RUF. Executive Outcomes, as a 
result of having much experience and being more technologically advanced, they were much 
more effective than the government in fighting the RUF. Executive Outcomes was critical in the 
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government’s effort to win the war as they were effective in “oblierat[ing] the RUF camps, [and] 
were very loyal as long as they were paid, and…they allowed the government to retake the 
diamond areas and obtain a reliable source of income” (Silberfein 2004, 224). In 1996 Executive 
Outcomes left the country when the government of Sierra Leone signed a treaty with the RUF.  
 The effect of the pro-government interventions of ECOMOG and Executive Outcomes, 
as they took place mid to end war, should be analyzed based on work that differentiates between 
types of interventions. As both ECOMOG and Executive Outcomes fought in support of the 
government, much literature (Regan 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000) finds unilateral 
intervention in the form of military assistance will increase the duration of a conflict. As neither 
ECOMOG nor Executive Outcomes were capable of fully eradicating the RUF and thereby 
ending the civil war in Sierra Leone, this case study provides evidence that unilateral military 
intervention in favor of the government will prolong a conflict.  
 From analyzing the previously described factors, it seems as though the war in Sierra 
Leone should have lasted longer than the average civil war as lootable resources, location of 
fighting, initial per capita income, and external interventions all played major roles in the 
prolonging the conflict, with only geography shortening the expected duration. These findings 
agree with the actual duration of the Sierra Leonean civil war as it lasted approximately nine 
years, which is longer than the average civil war in this project’s database, about 6.9 years, 
however a duration of nine years is still far below what would have been expected. Even though 
there are factors this study does not take into account that could have had a shortening effect on 
the duration of Sierra Leone’s civil war, they would not effect the expected duration that much 
that it would decrease to an anticipated duration close to the observed duration. A possible 
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explanation for why the war lasted shorter than would be expected is that UN intervention played 
a significant role in altering the course of the conflict.  
 Hypotheses 1 and 2:  Effect of Domestic Conditions and Type of Intervention (in Sierra 
Leone) 
 As previously stated, Sierra Leone saw two UN intervention missions. The first, the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), was established with the 
Security Council Resolution 1181 on 13 July 1998.  The mission’s main objectives were to 
monitor the military and security situation in the country, and to monitor the disarmament and 
demobilization of former combatants. As the mandate stated, the mission was established to 
observe the situation and report its findings back to the Security Council. The mission was not 
actively involved in ending the conflict. This is seen when the RUF in late 1998 and early 1999 
reinitiated fighting and overran the majority of Freetown. The UN mission did relatively little to 
prevent the return of fighting, and instead relocated to Conakry, Guinea which was when the 
Security Council then decided to downsize the mission. If simply analyzing the proposed 
hypothesis based on this mission, it would be apparent that in those civil wars that are expected 
to last shorter UN missions do not have a direct correlation with altering a war’s duration. 
However, upon UNOMSIL’s departure the Security Council established a second mission: the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 
 UNAMSIL was established in October 1999 and its main objectives were to assist in the 
implementation of the disarmament and demobilization plan established under the Lomé Peace 
Agreement, to provide security at important locations in Freetown and surrounding areas, and to 
assist the government in extending its authority throughout the country (Malan 2003, 57). 
Initially, it seemed as though UNAMSIL would be no more effective in curbing violence than 
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was UNOMSIL, as the available troop strength was too low to allow a widespread deployment 
(Malan et al. 2002). UNAMSIL was deployed hastily without sufficient troops largely because 
the lack of commitment by the RUF to stop fighting and the withdrawal of ECOMOG required 
the UN to make an attempt, even if rushed, at keeping the peace and resolving the conflict.  
 In April 2000, in order to facilitate the demobilization and disarmament process, a sub-
group of UNAMSIL opened new demobilization camps in RUF controlled locations. Instead of 
this quickening the process of disarmament, in actuality, it delayed the peace process in that RUF 
reneged on the peace agreement and attacked the UN camps in Makeni and Magburaka, taking 
over 500 UN hostages. It is thought that the original state of dysfunction of UNAMSIL “inspired 
both sides to renege on commitments made in the peace accords” (Howard 2008, 304). The RUF 
as a result of the attack on UN troops captured the armored personnel carriers used by the UN in 
order to launch an attack on Freetown. Inadvertently, the UN gave the RUF capacity and 
opportunity to resume fighting.  Upon this apparent failure of the UN mission, the UK sent in 
paratroopers and warships in order to protect British nationals, these troops however ended up 
assuming the role of the UN in defending parts of Freetown and the Lungi international airport 
(Malan et al. 2002, 11). A top UK official even stated that Britain was essentially running the 
day-to-day operations of UN forces. The above-mentioned situation shows that UNAMSIL 
increased the duration of the conflict, however this increase was mainly due to structural and 
organizational problems within the mission itself. In order to analyze the proposed hypothesis 
one also needs to determine if UNAMSIL engaged with or dealt with the factors that were 
expected to increase the war’s duration. 
 In terms of contraband, UNAMSIL did little to stem the production, which would have, 
in turn, lessened the profit to the RUF and presumably shortened the conflict. The mission could 
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have accomplished this, while still following the mandate and the three basic principles of UN 
peacekeeping, impartiality, consent of all parties, and non-use of force except in self-defense or 
defense of the mandate. A key objective of UNAMSIL was to actively assist is the 
demobilization of RUF combatants; however towards the end of the civil war only two towns 
within RUF controlled areas had UN deployments, and no towns within diamond producing 
areas had a UN presence (Hirsch 2001, 148-149). While there is no denying that the UN did have 
some success at camps throughout the country, it is apparent that the disarmament process could 
not have had a substantial effect in creating peace as the central combatants were not 
demobilized.   
 As the other factors that most affected Sierra Leone’s civil war (geography, initial per 
capita income, external intervention) the UN could not have changed, it is apparent that the UN 
Mission in Sierra Leone did not decrease the war’s duration.  While the UN mission did have a 
role in bringing all parties to the negotiating table, the evidence suggests that UNAMSIL had a 
small negative effect on the war’s duration, meaning the UN missions in Sierra Leone slightly 
increased the duration of the civil war. 
 Hypothesis 3: Interests of the 5 Permanent Security Council Members (in Sierra Leone) 
 The civil war in Sierra Leone saw moderate interest by the Permanent Five (P5) as a 
whole, however it saw great interest by Great Britain, a member of the P5. The relationship 
between Britain and Sierra Leone is one that was present years before the civil war began in 
1991. In 1781 Britain established a colony in Freetown as a refuge for freed slaves, and it 
quickly became the base of Britain’s West African empire. British companies also have had an 
invested interest in the state of affairs within Sierra Leone, as the major diamond producing 
companies in Sierra Leone (The Consolidated African Selection Trust and the Subsidiary Sierra 
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Leone Selection Trust) are British owned. As a result of the long-standing ties between the two 
countries, Britain felt a sense of responsibility to intervene in the war-torn country when it was 
apparent the UN mission was struggling. British military intervention was instrumental in the 
civil war and the disarmament process. Great Britain, throughout the civil war also maintained 
non-military links with Sierra Leone. For instance, from March 1998 until late 2000, the UK had 
given over sixty-five million pounds to the government of Sierra Leone’s Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (“Britain’s Role in Sierra Leone”).  
 In regards to the other members of the P5, interest was not as high. The United States 
played a moderate role in the civil war, as they helped establish the Lomé Peace Agreement in 
1999. This however was the extent of U.S. direct involvement in the civil war, as they did not 
send troops when UNAMSIL requested help. In terms of Security Council Resolutions there 
were only seventeen over the course of the entire conflict, with all of these resolutions coming 
post-1998. There were more resolutions regarding the state of affairs in Sierra Leone after the 
end date in 2000, however as the third proposed hypothesis is only concerned with the P5 
interest during the civil conflict, these resolutions are not relevant. 
 The next case study analyzed (Angola) is similar to that of Sierra Leone in terms of UN 
intervention. The cases differ, however, on their expected duration. Even though they share 
many factors of duration, such as contraband, it is important to examine how these variables 
interact with the conflict as a whole. This interaction is what sets Angola apart from Sierra 
Leone, and grants it a longer anticipated duration.  
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Angola 
  Background Information 
 The Angolan civil war was one of the longest and most destructive civil wars lasting over 
three decades and resulting in hundreds of thousand deaths and even more internally displaced 
peoples. The Angolan civil war was also one of the most heavily invested in by the United 
Nations with four separate missions and numerous Security Council Resolutions. The length of 
the civil war varies, as some databases and lists code the start and end dates differently 
depending on the definition of civil war used. The Correlates of War database codes the war as 
beginning in 1976 and lasted until 2002, while the civil war list used for this study classifies the 
war as a twenty-seven year conflict, starting in 1975 and ending in 2002. The civil war in Angola 
is occasionally sub-divided into two or three separate wars, however many civil war lists, 
including the one used for this study, classify the conflict as one continuous civil war as there 
was not a wholesale demobilization, a military victory or a peace agreement that was followed 
by at least three years of peace. This discrepancy is mainly due to problems associated with 
determining the end date of a war. For this project the end date of the Angolan civil war is 2002 
as this year marked the demobilization of the main rebel group and peace has since ensued.   
 Upon independence from Portugal in 1974, three main political parties within Angola, the 
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), agreed 
under the Alvor Accords to form a coalition government to rule the newly independent state. 
Personality, ethnic and ideological issues, however, soon led to conflict and disagreement among 
the parties. The MPLA was a socialist movement headed by Eduardo dos Santos and gained 
much of its support from the general populations in the Luanda region, while the remaining 
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nationalist movements were divided initially along ethnic lines. The UNITA movement, headed 
by Jonas Savimbi, drew much of its leadership from the Ovimbundu ethnic group, which was 
and continues to be the largest group in Angola with upwards of thirty percent of the population 
identifying as Ovimbundu (Bell 2010). The final movement, the FNLA, headed by Roberto 
Holden, was largely associated ethnic base of Bakongo (Bell 2010), the third largest ethnic 
group. Even though initially the main ethnic groups were associated with different rebel 
movements, ethnicity did not seem to have a significant impact on the duration of the civil war, 
because as the war continued the main rebel group did not claim to represent or fight for one 
ethnic group. In fact, UNITA is often mistaken for a tribal movement, as the Ovimbundu ethnic 
group comprises the core, however as the war progressed UNITA membership could not longer 
be described as falling along ethnic lines (Bect 2009, 348). 
 Soon after independence, each nationalist movement quickly pursued their own agenda. 
In 1975, with support from Soviet weapons and Cuban troops, the MPLA drove the FNLA and 
UNITA from the capital of Luanda and on November 11, 1975 declared the People’s Republic of 
Angola, effectively launching the Angolan Civil War. The FNLA was never able to regain their 
strength and thus withdrew from the conflict. The MPLA, even though they were now in control 
of the government, were unable to assert their legitimacy throughout the country, leading to the 
continuation of the conflict (James 1992, 7).  
 While animosity and diverging ideologies fueled the MPLA and UNITA to continue 
fighting, the scale at which the violence persisted was largely due to external support for each 
side. During the 1970s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the MPLA “de facto 
government [was] supported by the Soviet bloc,” and Cuba. Throughout the war, South Africa 
and the West were the main supporters of UNITA. From the years 1976 to 1985 the United 
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States indirectly supported UNITA through South Africa, however in 1986 the United States 
“began to make sizable military contribution to UNITA” (Lodico 1996, 107). Thus, the civil war 
in Angola, from 1975 until the end of the Cold War, was essentially a proxy war, which pitted 
the United States and the USSR indirectly against one another. The international support for each 
group, however, did not solely fuel the conflict during the 1970s and 1980s, in fact “beyond their 
international backing, the MPLA elite in Luanda or abroad prospered from the growing oil 
revenues, while UNITA sustained its bid for power from diamond revenue and control of 
populations in the hinterland” (Le Billon 2001, 58).  
 The early 1990s saw two peace accords created, the Bicesse Peace Accords and Acordos 
de Paz para Angola, which resulted in a brief hiatus from fighting. In September of 1992 
elections called for by the Bicesse Accords were held, and results declared Dos Santos, leader of 
the MPLA, the victor. While the elections seemed to be the first step in ending the Angolan civil 
war, Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, soon declared fraud and fighting quickly ensued. The 
following two years resulted in more devastation and killing then the previous decades 
combined, with “indiscriminate killing of UNITA supporters and Ovimbundus in Luanda” and 
throughout the country (Le Billon 2001, 58-59).  Another peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol 
initiated in 1994, sought to establish peace and a ceasefire in Angola, however UNITA was 
reluctant to abide by the measures and continued fighting. As the war continued for the next 
decade, the ideological reasons for fighting diminished and the war was now a pure resource 
conflict in which fighting continued because of the revenue gained from oil and diamond 
production (Almeida 2010, 4). The Angolan civil war came to an end in 2002 following the 
death of UNITA’s charismatic leader, Jonas Savimbi. After the death of Savimbi, the 
government was able to seize more power and legitimacy, and just six weeks after the death of 
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Savimbi, the government and UNITA signed a peace agreement that ended the Angolan civil war 
(Almeida 2010, 9).   
 Expected Duration (Angola) 
 The factors that influenced the duration of the civil war in Angola are very similar to 
those that affected the civil war in Sierra Leone, however differences are apparent. The main 
factors that contributed to the expected duration of the Angolan civil war are: contraband, oil, 
geography, and lack of UN intervention.  
 As with the civil war in Sierra Leone, diamonds played a crucial role in prolonging the 
Angolan civil war. Diamonds in Angola are found over a wide range with the highest 
concentration in the northeast. Alluvial diamonds and diamonds mined from kimberlite deposits 
contributed to Angola, in the early 2000s, being the fourth largest producer of diamonds (Le 
Billon 2001, 67). In terms of fueling the civil conflict, diamonds were a major source of finance 
for UNITA since the late 1970s, and increased in the early 1990s when the US and South Africa 
withdrew their support. Realizing the importance of diamonds as a major source of financing, 
UNITA “professionalized its diamond operations, training its staff in diamond sorting and 
investing in mining equipment,” thus showing that, rather then use the diamonds solely to obtain 
weapons and arms, as the RUF did in Sierra Leone, UNITA aimed for diamonds to fund a long 
lasting civil war, one in which they would profit from (Le Billon 2001, 67). While it is unknown 
the level of profits UNITA received from its diamond production, for the period of 1992 to 2000 
the value of diamonds produced is estimated at around US $3-4 billion (Le Billon 2001, 69).   
 The manner in which the diamonds are used largely determines the role they play in a 
conflict’s duration. Some authors speculate that diamonds increase a war’s duration because as a 
dependable source of weapons and finance is provided, while others hypothesize that contraband 
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increases a war’s duration because it reduces incentives for a peaceful settlement as the parties 
are more focused on monetary gain. The effect of diamonds on the Angolan civil war was 
particularly strong as diamonds were not only used as a means of finance but also provided 
incentives to continue fighting and not find a peaceful settlement. The illegal exchange of 
diamonds was used by UNITA to “to purchase, deploy, and resupply expensive weapon systems 
through an extensive network of private corporations and foreign state authorities” (Le Billon 
2001, 67). Despite the abundance of technologically advanced weapons, it is interesting that 
UNITA never launched a full-scale attack on the state center. This thus suggests the notion that 
the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, and other top ranking officials, prolonged the war in order 
to gain monetarily; peace would have meant development of the diamond industry with the 
government and international firms profiting from the mining. In order for UNITA to continue 
profiting from diamonds, illegal activities were necessary.  
 The majority of the peace agreements signed over the course of the war did not take this 
into account and as a result fighting continued. For instance, the Lusaka agreement granted” a 
limited number of government posts to UNITA, in return for the rebels returning the territory 
under their control to state administration” (Pearce 2004, 54). However the majority of the land 
held by UNITA was diamond-producing land and therefore, the agreement most likely failed as a 
result of the accord failing to realize the war was essentially a war over resources; UNITA was 
reluctant to give over their land because influential leaders of UNITA desired to “secure a stake 
for themselves in the mining industry” (Pearce 2004, 54).  In 1997 only under military pressure 
did UNITA return the main diamond-producing area of Lunda to the government.  
 Even though it is unclear as to which causal mechanism is responsible for the greatest 
effect on a war’s duration, both could be the underlying cause of why contraband has such a 
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great impact on a war’s duration. Therefore, as diamonds in the Angolan civil war not only 
helped militarily finance the main rebel group, they also created incentives for UNITA 
leadership to forego a peaceful settlement, it is apparent that diamonds had the most impact on 
the conflict’s duration.  The effect of diamonds on the Angolan civil war was much greater than 
in Sierra Leone’s civil war, however in order to determine whether the Angolan civil war was 
expected to last longer than the Sierra Leonean civil war, more research into the important 
variables of the Angolan civil war is needed.  
 In addition to Angola’s natural endowment of diamonds, the country also has an 
abundant supply of oil. In 2001 Angola produced 780,000 barrels of oil per day, which was then 
only second to Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is estimated that this production should 
quadruple by 2015 (Le Billon 2001, 61).  In the 1990s it was estimated that oil was responsible 
for over 90% of Angola’s official exports and 80% of the government’s total revenue. The 
MPLA led government, however, did not use this money to better the Angolan people but rather 
to resist attacks from UNITA (Le Billon 2001, 61). The off shore oil production gave the 
government an advantage as the off shore location provided no way for the rebels to infiltrate.  
While quantitative studies have found oil to affect the onset of a civil, the effect of oil on the 
duration of a civil war is ambiguous and debated. As previously stated, an advantage with a case 
study approach is one can determine whether a variable has an effect on a conflict’s duration that 
quantitative studies may not necessarily deem important. Such as, quantitative studies have 
found that overall oil is not robustly correlated with conflict duration, however this does not 
mean that oil is not robustly correlated with duration for every conflict, there may be some 
conflicts in which oil has a great effect on prolonging or shortening the conflict. Angola is a 
prime example of this. Upon independence, UNITA and the MPLA both had considerable 
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external funding and aid in which both groups relied on to fuel the conflict. UNITA, since the 
late 1970s, was focused on capturing the diamond-producing areas of Angola and as a result had 
a considerable amount of profit in order to sustain fighting and re-supply their heavy artillery (Le 
Billon 2001, 71). At one point during the war, UNITA controlled a majority of the country, and 
would have likely defeated the MPLA led government if oil revenue had not helped the 
government sustain political order through coercion and clientelism. The revenue the 
government obtained from its oil reserves thus prolonged the Angolan civil war as it equalized 
the balance of power between the main actors, thus preventing an early victory for either side.      
 Geography also had a large influence on the duration of the civil conflict in Angola. As 
previously stated the larger the scope of a conflict the longer the conflict will last; the further 
away from the state center fighting occurs, the longer is the expected duration of the conflict. In 
contrast to the size of Sierra Leone (71,740 square kilometers), the size of Angola is 
approximately 1,246,700 square kilometers. While the majority of Angola does not fall under the 
category of rough terrain, there are plateaus and mountains in the central interior that could 
possibly affect the government’s ability to successfully fight UNITA. In fact, for a majority of 
the war, UNITA’s headquarters was in Huambo, which is over 200 miles from the state center 
and located in the central plateau region of the country.  Thus, as the terrain in Angola is more 
variable than that in Sierra Leone, and since the absolute size is greater, meaning government 
forces would have further to travel than in Sierra Leone, it follows that this would have an 
increasing effect on the conflict’s duration.  
 Additionally, as fighting was not centralized close to the state center, it therefore follows 
that because of this, the war would last relatively longer than the war in Sierra Leone. From 
analyzing the Angolan civil war, it seems as though UNITA when re-entering the country in the 
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1980s purposefully took control of the diamond mining regions, and purposefully engaged in 
fighting mainly in the interior, rural areas far from the state center of Luanda. Thus, unlike in 
Sierra Leone, the main rebel group in Angola did not actively seek out fighting the government 
in the state center, but rather the government came to them.    
 Non-UN external intervention also played a crucial role in increasing the duration of the 
conflict. As previously stated, the civil war in Angola was a Cold War proxy site, which pitted 
the U.S. indirectly against the Soviet Union.  The MPLA in the initial stages of the war was 
supported by mainly the Soviet Union and Cuba, while UNITA was supported by the United 
States and apartheid South Africa (Beck 2009, 345-346). This external intervention gave both 
sides substantial financial and weapons support, thus equalizing the balance of power between 
the parties. The war may have been shorter if foreign forces had not intervened, as it seemed the 
MPLA was militarily stronger than UNITA (Beck 2009, 346). 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2: Effect of Domestic Conditions and Type of Intervention (in Angola) 
 Between the years 1988 and 1999, the UN deployed four separate missions to Angola 
(Howard 2008, 35). Upon first glance one could assume these missions did not effect the 
duration of the conflict as the war ended in 2002, years after the withdrawal of the last mission. 
However, as with Sierra Leone, simply examining the hypothesis in regards to whether the 
mission failed or not, is not entirely correct. In order to determine the effectiveness of the 
missions on the war’s duration, we need to examine how the missions dealt with the factors that 
were instrumental in the conflict’s duration.  
  The first UN mission in Angola, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
(UNAVEM I) was established to verify the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops. As 
seen, the external intervention in the beginning stages of the civil war most likely increased the 
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expected duration of the conflict because both the MPLA and UNITA received aid, thus 
equalizing the balance of power. UNAVEM I, as it negotiated the withdrawal and actually 
participated in overseeing the withdrawal of the foreign troops, was an important “adjunct to the 
peace process in southern Africa” (Fortna 1993, 385). Even though fighting resumed between the 
MPLA and UNITA after the foreign withdrawal of troops, the first UN mission in Angola did 
decrease the duration of the conflict as it rid the country of external influences that have been 
found to negatively effect duration and as it set the foundation for future internal peace 
processes, such as the Bicesse Accords. 
 The second mission, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II was established 
in 1991 with the Security Council resolution 696. The role of the mission was: to monitor the 
ceasefire established by the Bicesse Peace Accords, and to observe and verify the democratic 
elections. Even though this mission was present in a majority of the country, in regions 
controlled by both the government and UNITA, as a result of their limited mandate, they did not 
have a positive or negative effect on the war’s duration. The mission did not attempt to curb 
UNITA’s diamond funding, their mission as stated by the mandate was essentially created to 
“watch the watchers” (Fortna 1993, 393).  
 As UN missions are created to keep the peace, one would assume that these missions 
would actively attempt to deal with the main factors that are expected to make the fighting 
continue. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III was established in 1995 after the 
Lusaka Peace Accord was signed, and was mandated to: monitor the ceasefire, verify the 
demobilization and disarmament of troops, verify the extension of the state administration to 
UNITA controlled areas, and collect and supervise UNITA arms, and monitor and verify the 
presidential elections (Howard 2008, 39). Given the mission’s mandate and main objectives, it 
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would appear that this mission would be more effective in altering the duration of the conflict 
than previous missions. This mission did have a slightly positive effect on the duration, as the 
mission was present in a majority of Angola, in both the MPLA and UNITA controlled areas. As 
the absolute size of Angola played a major role in increasing the expected duration of the 
conflict, increasing the areas to which peacekeepers and the government have access to should 
shorten the conflict. UNAVEM III was not more effective because, in UNITA’s view, it lacked 
legitimacy. The final mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), faired 
no better than the previous missions. The UN terminated MONUA in February of 1999 after the 
mission was unable to keep the peace and a full-scale war ensued.  From analyzing the four UN 
missions in Angola, it appears that the first and third missions were the only missions that dealt 
with factors impeding peace.  
 Hypothesis 3: Interests of the 5 Permanent Members of the Security Council (in Angola) 
 The level of interest of the Permanent Five (P5) in the Security Council varied over the 
course of the three decade long civil war in Angola, however throughout the majority of the war, 
the level of interest was moderately higher than in Sierra Leone. As the beginning of the 
Angolan civil war was essentially a Cold War proxy site, it would follow that the majority of the 
P5 (United States, Russia, and China) would have an invested interest in the outcome of the 
conflict.   
 Interest in the war eventually decreased with the end of the Cold War. Even though the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union helped negotiate a peace accord between UNITA and the MPLA led 
government, the subsequent mission (UNAVEM II) showed this lack of interest, as it was a 
small mission; the Security Council did not want to create another massive and costly 
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peacekeeping operation. It is often noted that this mission, as a result of being too small and 
disorganized, actually made the situation in Angola worse than ever before.  
 From 1993 onwards, the evidence suggests that the P5 were much more interested in the 
conflict than before as approximately half of the seventy-one Security Council resolutions 
regarding Angola were drafted post-1993 and, Russia and the U.S. were once again involved in 
the peace process, as they helped draft the Lusaka Peace Accords. While the UN Missions were 
required to remain impartial to either side, it is clear that members of the P5 are not obligated to 
do so, as in the years 1993, 1997, and 1998, the Security Council placed sanctions on UNITA. 
This is important because never before had the UN placed sanctions on a non-governmental 
entity (Howard 2008, 38). The Permanent Five showed their interest in Angola not only by 
voting in favor of sanctions on UNITA but also by: supplying the MPLA led government with 
weapons (done by Russia and China), selling military aircrafts to the government (U.S.). The 
United States in particular has had a high level of interest in solving the Angolan civil war, as 
Angola has consistently been a large exporter of oil to the United States (Howard 2008).  The 
end of the war continued to see continuing interest from the Security Council as approximately 
ten resolutions were created from 2000 to 2002. 
 The final case study this project examines is that of Colombia.  The civil war in 
Colombia and the conflict in Angola are given similar expected durations, as the interplay 
between many factors of duration and the conflict itself are similar. The case studies differ 
greatly, however, on the variable of UN intervention, as the Colombian civil war has never been 
the recipient of UN peacekeeping and it is likely it never will be. 
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Colombia 
  Background Information 
 The third case study this project will examine is that of the low intensity but long-lasting 
civil war in Colombia. The Colombian conflict began in 1963 and is currently ongoing. In 
contrast to the civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone, the war in Colombia has claimed much 
fewer lives, approximately 44,000 people and is mainly a war between two guerrilla groups – the 
Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) – 
and the people supported government known as the National Front. The FARC, currently still 
active in Colombia, was founded in 1964 and as of 2004 had approximately 16,000 to 20,000 
fighters (Restrepo et al., 2004, 400). The other guerrilla group, ELN, was founded in 1965 and of 
2004 was estimated to have between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters. It is important to note that these 
guerrilla groups are separate entities and do not fight solely against the government, they also 
fight each other.  
 The origins of the Colombian Civil War lie in the country’s political past. Even though 
the end of the period known as La Violencia established a coalition government of the two main 
political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, the underlying factors that caused La 
Violencia decades ago were still present throughout society years after it ended. The continued 
economic instability led to growing discontent with the repressive government and soon led to 
guerrilla group formation. The civil war in Colombia differs greatly from many other civil wars 
as it was not caused by “polarization along religious, regional or ethnic divisions,” but rather, the 
guerrilla groups fought the government on the basis of ideological differences. Both the major 
guerrilla groups claimed to fight and represent “the rural poor by supporting aims such as land 
redistribution” (Dube and Vargas 2007, 9). It is unclear whether the main objective of the 
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guerrilla groups was to overthrow the government or to gain profits from fighting a long lasting, 
low intensity civil war. While the major guerrilla groups both supposedly had the same initial 
idea of overthrowing the government, the groups were fundamentally different. The ELN, which 
was a direct product of the Cuban revolution, was driven by Cold War ideologies and practices, 
while the FARC was a Colombian born resistance movement and “the heir of a long and 
endogenous process of accumulation of peasant armed resistance” (Sanín 2004, 263).  
 The beginning years of the Colombian civil conflict were marked by low intensity 
violence favoring the government that barely met the criteria for a civil war (Restrepo et al. 
2004, 401). However, as the war continued, the intensity of violence steadily increased in the 
1970s as an alleged fraudulent election increased support for the guerrilla groups. This increase 
in intensity has also been attributed to the rise of another guerrilla group, known as M-19. Rather 
than promoting Cold War ideologies, M-19 promoted national imagery, which resulted in brining 
the urban middle class into the war. Even though M-19 failed militarily and withdrew from the 
conflict in the form of a peace process, it succeeded in bringing the war to the forefront of 
Colombian politics, which ultimately helped the FARC and the ELN to increase their intensity 
(Sanín 2004, 265).  The war continued, and as with Angola, the Cold War period resulted in 
steady fighting, as both the FARC and the ELN were recipients of mainly economic support 
from the Soviet bloc, thus the Colombian civil war was also a Cold War proxy site (Dube and 
Vargas 2007, 9). The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the subsequent break up of the drug 
cartels in the mid-1990s resulted in both the FARC and ELN becoming involved in the drug 
trade and using this trade as their main source of finance (Iannone 2003, 4).  
 Not only did the 1990s alter how the guerrilla groups financed the war, it also saw an 
increased intensity in fighting.  Both guerrilla groups expanded their location of fighting. During 
 60 
 
the years 1987 to 2000, FARC “expanded operations from 26 to 48 fronts, while ELN expanded 
from 4 fronts to 41 fronts” (Sanchez and Palau, 2006). The 1990s also saw the creation of 
another other major actor in Colombia’s civil war, the paramilitary groups of the United Self-
Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), which was formally created in 1997 and was estimated in 
2004 to have approximately 13,000 fighters (Restrepo et al. 2004, 400). As each guerrilla group 
throughout the course of the war brought their separate subsections of the population to the 
forefront of the war, the AUC was and continues to be “financed by large landowners and 
therefore seen to be affiliated with the political and economic elite” (Dube and Vargas 2007, 9). 
 The late 1990s and the 2000s saw numerous peace agreements between the government, 
the FARC and ELN, most notably a period of peace of approximately three years was established 
in a demilitarized area known as Despeje in the country’s south (Restrepo et al. 2004, 400). Also, 
the year 2003 saw peace and demobilization talks among the Colombian government and the 
paramilitary group, AUC. Despite the peace talks, armed actions peaked for all three groups in 
2000 and have continued to increase throughout the decade. The FARC are by far the most 
actively involved in prolonging the civil conflict, however both the FARC and ELN are 
frequently involved in massacres, kidnapping, killing, and the use of antipersonnel landmines 
(Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia 2011). The demobilization talks between 
the government and the paramilitary were claimed by the Uribe administration to have been 
successful, and thus the government stated the paramilitary were completely demobilized, 
however many claim this not to be the case. The Colombian National Police as of 2009 claim the 
large paramilitary groups to have upwards of 4,000 fighters and continue to engage in the drug 
trade, massacres, killings and rape Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia 2011).  
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The civil war in Colombia is currently ongoing and it has continued to result in relatively high 
levels of armed conflict. 
 Expected Duration (Colombia) 
 The factors that play major roles in the continuation of the Colombian conflict are similar 
to those of Angola and include: contraband in the form of narcotics, oil, geography, and non-UN 
intervention. The role of contraband in the Colombian civil war is the most robust of the three 
case studies used, as the majority of the main actors rely on narcotics trafficking and as intensity 
of fighting is closely linked to narcotics. The Colombian civil war is often referred to as a 
‘greedy war’ in which the main actors continued to engage in conflict as they profited monetarily 
from war. In the beginning years of the war the main guerrilla groups, the FARC and the ELN 
did not rely on contraband as a means of funding; the war during this time was of rather low-
intensity, some even describing the main actors as “guerrillas without war” (Sanín 2004, 265). 
As the war progressed the guerrilla groups began establishing themselves within the narcotic 
production, which helped them expand not only their numbers, but also their influence. The 
opportunity for this largely came as a result of the demise of the original drug cartels. The FARC 
gains from controlling the coca producing territories in various ways: it acts as “an interface 
between the peasants and the intermediaries, regulating commerce…and setting prices,” it 
collects a tax on the production and trade of the narcotics, additionally it may also “participate 
directly in the commercialization and exportation of coca” (Sanín 2004, 266).  FARC’s ability to 
capitalize on coca production allowed it, in the mid-1990s, to amass more than $600 million a 
year, making it one of the richest insurgents groups in history (Parado 2000, 70).  While FARC 
was originally a guerrilla group seeking political power, it seems as though that as the war 
progressed this want for political power diminished. While it is apparent that coca sustains 
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FARC’s war efforts it is unclear whether FARC uses the profit to fight the government in order 
to gain political power or rather simply to maintain the instability, which is needed to extract 
profits from illicit crops.  
 Non-UN intervention, mainly in the form of policy pressure and economic intervention, 
has also played a crucial role in the continuation of the Colombian civil conflict. The main goal 
the U.S. has in indirectly intervening in the Colombian civil conflict is to curb the amount of 
drugs from Colombia and neighboring countries entering the United States. As the Colombian 
civil war is one fueled largely by narcotics, it is important to note that any U.S. intervention 
aimed at drugs should have a large effect on the civil war as a whole. United States policy 
intervention aided in increasing the duration of the conflict as it altered the balance of power 
between the main combatants. The United States’ pressure on Colombia to destroy the Medellín 
cartel and the Cali cartel in the late 1980s and early 1990s greatly increased the power of the 
FARC as they no longer were challenged by paramilitary groups who were weakened by the 
destruction of the drug cartels. As a result, by the end of the 1990s FARC “had built eight fronts 
in the Middle Magdalena Valley and had strengthened its presence throughout the areas that had 
been dominated by paramilitary groups during the late 1980s (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 104).  
The destruction of the Mendellín cartels removed one of FARC’s main political and military 
competitors, therefore increasing the power of the FARC. A similar outcome was produced with 
the destruction of the Cali drug cartel. The U.S. did not only engage in pressuring the Colombia 
government to destroy the cartels, they also gave $100 million annually to Colombia in the early 
1990s (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 105). The demise of the two major drug cartels left an industry 
for the FARC to exploit. The fall of the cartels also led to a longer civil war in Colombia because 
as a result of the cartels being replaced by smaller-scale operations, transnational transportation 
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networks were no longer feasible, this thus increased the Colombian cultivation of coca.  For 
instance, in 1993 Colombia was only producing 20 percent of the region’s coca, while by the end 
of the 1990s Colombia was producing approximately 75 percent of the region’s coca.  With the 
majority of the coca cultivation located in FARC strongholds, it is apparent that the demise of 
the drug cartels led the FARC to take over the coca industry and increase its strength, which in 
turn made it a more difficult opponent for the Colombian government. Additionally, U.S. 
pressure also increased public support for the FARC. For instance, the U.S. pressure on 
Colombian government to eradicate the coca fields increased FARC support among the locals, 
leading them to turn to the FARC for protection against the government (Peceny and Durnan 
2006, 101).  
 The geography of Colombia also has played a vital role in the continuation of the 
conflict, as the guerrilla groups and paramilitary have largely been located in difficult to access 
rural hinterlands characterized by rough terrain. The absolute size of Colombia, 1,138,910 square 
kilometers is similar to that of Angola but the composition of that size is very different. In 
comparison to Sierra Leone the absolute size of Colombia, which is quite larger than that of 
Sierra Leone, plays a more vital role in the conflict’s duration as the government has a 
disadvantage in operating over long distances comprised largely of rough terrain. Not only does 
the absolute distance give the government a distinct disadvantage, the terrain in which the 
government has to travel makes them less effective at fighting the insurgents. The FARC is 
located primarily in the coca producing regions of the south and east, namely the provinces of 
Caqueta, Guaviare, and Putumayo, characterized by tropical rainforests  (Peceny and Durnan 
2006, 107).  Dense forest favors insurgent groups as it makes them harder to detect and it 
essentially protects them from the enemy, thus they are able to continue fighting for longer 
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periods of time (Buhaug et al. 2009, 551).  Additionally, the ELN throughout the war has been 
mainly located in the west, which is characterized by the Andes mountain range. Even though 
the ELN is noticeably smaller than the FARC they have been difficult for the government to 
fully defeat, as the rugged terrain proves difficult. 
  
Hypotheses 1 and 2: Effect of Domestic Conditions and Type of Intervention (in Colombia) 
 In terms of the first proposed hypothesis, the data suggests that the war in Colombia 
would be approximately equal to, or greater than the war in Angola as the main factors affecting 
duration are quite similar, the interplay between these variables are also similar, and because 
general characteristics, such as timing, are also comparable. Thus, if the first hypothesis were 
correct then UN intervention would be minimally effective in the Colombian civil war. However, 
as it was seen, the UN was fairly successful in altering the duration of the Angolan civil war, 
thus if similar approaches are taken in Colombia, UN intervention could also shorten the conflict. 
The use of the Colombian civil war as a case study is useful in terms of determining whether the 
relationship between UN intervention and civil war duration is a multivariable relationship in 
wars that last much longer than average. As the expected durations of the Angolan and 
Colombian wars are similar, if the relationship between UN intervention and duration is a 
multivariate relationship in which intervention has a minimal effect, then we should see the wars 
lasting around the same number of years. Also, as both wars were most heavily influenced by 
contraband, both should last around the average for these wars, which is approximately forty-
eight years. The war in Colombia was a forty-five year conflict in 2009, and thus is in line with 
the prediction, however the Angolan civil war was a twenty-seven year conflict, which is shorter 
than expected, but not dramatically so. It seems as though there was not a direct bivariate 
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relationship between UN intervention and the conflict’s duration as the UN did not dramatically 
decrease the duration, but that there was not an extreme multivariate relationship either as the 
UN did play a role in shortening the conflict’s duration. This, therefore, does not support the idea 
that the relationship between UN intervention and the duration of a conflict is a strict 
multivariate relationship in which intervention has a minimal effect.  
 In terms of the second proposed hypothesis, Colombia would most likely benefit from 
UN interventions similar to that of Angola as they are closely related in terms of expected 
duration. In order for UN intervention to have a decreasing effect on the civil war in Colombia, 
the missions would have to take a similar approach as done in Angola. The missions would need 
to have mandates that focus on the factors that are shown to prolong the conflict. As the 
relationship between the factors of duration and the conflict are very strong, a UN intervention 
would have to actively engage with these variables.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Interests of the 5 Permanent Security Council Members (in Colombia) 
 As seen, the civil war in Colombia is heavily invested in by the United States. While the 
U.S. has not and does not plan on direct military intervention in Colombia, the U.S. has directly 
influenced the progress of the civil war through pressuring the Colombian government into 
policy favoring the U.S and through economic means. It is apparent that the U.S. has great 
interest in Colombia; however, the remainder of the Permanent Five in the Security Council do 
not seem to have great interest in the outcome of the civil war or the country of Colombia. 
Throughout the course of the civil war, the Security Council has issued one resolution on the 
state of affairs within Colombia, Resolution 1465, which condemned a bombing in the capital 
city of Bogotá. The situation regarding Colombia and the interests of the Permanent Five seems 
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to be similar to that of Sierra Leone, in that one member has much interest in the country, while 
the remaining members are rather ambivalent.  Strictly evaluating potential UN effectiveness in 
terms of hypothesis three, it seems as though UN peacekeeping operations would not help 
decrease the duration of the conflict.  
  
Summary of Findings 
 Hypothesis 1 
 From examining the variables that had the most effect on each conflict’s expected 
duration, it appears Sierra Leone should have had the shortest duration of conflict. Even though 
all three cases were greatly affected by lootable resources, the diamonds in Sierra Leone led to a 
more severe and quick conflict than in Angola or Colombia, as the rebel group benefiting from 
the resources used the profit to actively seek political power by launching attacks on the state 
center. In Angola and Colombia the groups benefiting from contraband profit did not actively 
seek out government forces to as great a degree as the RUF in Sierra Leone, and this most likely 
resulted in the differences in the effect of the contraband among the three cases.  
 Additionally, Sierra Leone was expected to have the shortest duration, as geography did 
not play as large of a role as it did in Angola or Colombia. Even though all three conflicts did 
have non-UN intervention to an extent, the external intervention in Sierra Leone seemed to be 
the only intervention that alternated the balance of power in favor of one side. The non-UN 
interventions in Angola and Colombia seemed rather to make the balance of power more equal, 
thus making these conflicts last longer. Additionally, the initial per capita income was much 
lower in Sierra Leone than in the other two countries, however as scholars have found this 
variable to have a rather minimal effect on duration, this variable alone cannot increase the 
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expected duration to a point where one could reasonably find the conflict in Sierra Leone to last 
longer than the conflicts in Angola or Colombia. Also based on the examined variables, this 
study finds that the civil wars in Angola and Colombia are expected to have similar durations as 
the characteristics and interplay between the variables is very similar. These expected durations 
are consistent with the actual durations of the conflicts, as the conflict in Sierra Leone lasted nine 
years, while the Angolan and Colombian conflicts lasted considerably greater, at twenty-seven 
years and forty-five years.  
 If the first proposed hypothesis, which states UN effectiveness in ending a conflict 
decreases with the longer the expected duration, eventually becoming an unimportant factor in a 
multivariate relationship, is correct then we would expect to see the UN peacekeeping operations 
in Sierra Leone to have been more effective in shortening the conflict than the interventions in 
Angola.  After comparing the successfulness of the UN missions in Angola and Sierra Leone, it 
appears Angola saw more success in terms of decreasing the expected war duration. While this 
success was slight, as fighting intensified in the years after foreign troop withdrawal and after 
UNAVEM III. Even though the war did not end for years after the withdrawal of foreign troops 
and of UNAVEM III, the evidence still shows that the missions in Angola were relatively more 
effective than those in Sierra Leone. However, to say that the relationship between the UN 
interventions in Angola and the conflict duration was strictly a direct bivariate relationship is 
currently unfounded. It seems as though the relationship between UN intervention and civil war 
duration is more complex, depending on pre-existing domestic factors.   
 Hypothesis 2 
 As seen in the above sections, it is apparent that there is a major difference between UN 
Observer/Verification Missions and UN Missions/Operations in terms of their mandates. The UN 
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Observer Mission in Sierra Leone did not have an effect, either positive or negative, on the 
duration of the conflict. The UN Mission that was deployed to Sierra Leone arguably increased 
the duration of the conflict through its lack of legitimacy and organization. As previously stated, 
the first verification missions in Angola had a slight positive effect on the duration as its actions 
helped rid the country of foreign influences. Also, the third verification mission in Angola helped 
decrease the duration of the conflict as it lessened the problem of geography. If all the Observer 
or Verification Missions in the two countries had a positive effect on the respective durations, 
then one could reasonably assert that these interventions are more effective than UN Missions or 
Operations, however they did not. It is difficult to make a claim such as this when the majority of 
the Observer/Verification Missions had no effect in changing the durations. Strictly from 
examining Sierra Leone and Angola, the evidence found does not support my second hypothesis, 
as the Observer/Verification Missions were relatively more successful than the UN 
Mission/Operation.  
  
Hypothesis 3 
 As according to the third hypothesis, it would be expected that the UN interventions in 
Angola would be most effective as the Permanent Five had the most interest in the conflict and 
the country itself.  From comparing the UN Missions in Angola and Sierra Leone, it was found 
that the UN interventions in Angola were most effective.  Thus, the evidence found supports the 
third hypothesis, which states that UN interventions will be most effective in those conflicts that 
are of greater interest to the Security Council, most specifically the Permanent Five. It is 
interesting that all the missions deployed to Angola were either Verification or Observer 
missions. This may indicate that the Permanent 5 deploys Observer/Verification missions to 
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countries that they have a greater interest in because these missions are relatively more 
successful in ending fighting. This statement is in opposition to what one would expect given 
that UN Missions/Operations seem to be a more serious commitment by the UN to end civil war. 
Additional research, however, would have to be conducted in order to determine whether this 
assertion that the UN deploys Verification/ Observer Missions to those conflicts that the 
Permanent 5 are most invested in is correct. 
 Hypothetically, if Colombia were to become the recipient of UN intervention, based 
strictly on the findings in regards to hypothesis three, we would expect UN intervention in 
Colombia to be less successful than that of Angola. This is because the Permanent 5 had a great 
deal of interest in seeing the conflict in Angola end peacefully. In Colombia, however, the 
United States is currently the only member of the Permanent 5 to display a heavy interest in the 
outcome of the Colombian civil war. Since over the course of the four decade civil war the UN 
has never intervened, it is unlikely they ever will; that the interests of solely the United States is 
not enough for the Security Council to issue a peacekeeping mission to Colombia.  
 
Implications 
 While my project initially argued UN intervention to be less effective in those conflicts 
expecting to last longer than average, the evidence finds the contrary, that UN intervention is 
relatively more effective in those civil wars that are expected to last longer. This, however, is a 
statement based on three cases studies and is likely not the case for all long lasting conflicts that 
have or have had UN intervention. This also does not mean that the UN should only intervene in 
these conflicts. The UN, as a global peacekeeping force, should not limit its scope to that of 
longer lasting conflicts, but rather decide which conflicts to influence by the conflict’s effect or 
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possible effect on the international community. As expected, I found those missions that engaged 
with the factors of duration specific to the country were relatively more effective than missions 
with generic mandates. While each mission mandate is slightly different, most tend to have 
underlying themes such as monitoring the ceasefire or verifying elections. The mandate for each 
new mission should include these themes, but should also focus on changing the dynamics of 
factors within the country, as this should be most effective in shortening a conflict. Creating 
mandates that focus on these factors does not mean altering the three basic principles of 
peacekeeping. As seen from Angola, a mission can focus on changing a factor of duration, and 
thus shortening a conflict while remaining impartial, acquiring the consent of all main parties, 
and not using force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate.  
 While not necessarily shown in the case studies chosen for project, the UN has had a 
positive impact on many civil wars. The UN has helped to curb fighting and bring all warring 
parties to the bargaining table in many cases of civil conflict. The UN, however, is still plagued 
by their intervention failures. While this project found the UN to be relatively more effective in 
ending long lasting conflicts, this may not apply to large sample of civil wars. Based on this, 
further research into whether this statement applies to a general sample of cases would be an 
important addition to civil war studies. This completed project adds to civil war literature, as it 
does not assume there is only one effect of external intervention on civil war duration. A 
conflict’s duration is largely dependent upon how the UN peacekeeping force interacts with the 
internal factors that are likely to increase duration. While not necessarily the primary predictor of 
duration, the UN can have a positive influence on civil war length if the missions understand the 
country and the situation they are coming into. In order to increase the rates of success, UN 
peacekeeping missions need to understand that a conflict’s duration is largely dependent upon 
 71 
 
domestic factors. They should attempt to directly alter how these factors interact with the 
warring parties and the war itself. The findings from this research project are significant as they 
may aid the UN in increasing their peacekeeping success rate, thus helping to stem the violence 
from civil wars that in past years has been increasing at an alarming rate. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Summary of Case Studies 
 
Country Case 
 
Expected Duration Based on 
Domestic Factors 
 
Role of UN Intervention 
Sierra Leone 
 
Relatively shorter than Angola and 
Colombia 
Overall a negative effect; may have 
elongated the conflict. 
Angola  
 
Longer than average and longer than 
Sierra Leone. Duration should be 
comparable to Colombia 
Relatively positive effect; may have 
helped to shorten the duration.  
Colombia 
 
Longer than average and longer than 
Sierra Leone. Duration should be 
similar to Angola 
N/A 
 
Table 4: UN Missions 
Country 
 
UN Mission (Duration in Parentheses) 
Afghanistan UNAMA (2002-Present); UNGOMAP (May 88-Mar 90) 
Angola* UNAVEM I (Dec 88-Jun 91); UNAVEM II (Jun 91-Feb 95); 
UNAVEM III (Feb 95-Feb 97); MONUA (Jun 97-Feb 99) 
 
Bosnia 
UNPROFOR (Jun 92-Mar 95); UNMIBH (Dec 95-Dec 02) 
Burundi ONUB (Jun 04-Dec 06) 
Cambodia UNAMIC (Oct 91-Mar 92); UNTAC (Feb 92-Sep 93) 
Central African Republic MINURCAT (Sep 07-Dec 10) 
Chad MINURCAT (Sep 07-Dec 10) 
Cote d’Ivoire  MINUCI (May 03-Apr 04); UNOCI (Apr 04-Present) 
Croatia UNPROFOR (Feb 92-Mar 95); UNCRO (Mar 95-Jan 96); 
UNTAES (Jan 96-Dec 97); UNPSG (Jan 98-Oct 98); UNMOP 
(Feb 96-Dec 02) 
Cyprus UNFICYP (Mar 94-Present) 
Democratic Republic of Congo MONUC (Dec 99-Jun 10) 
East Timor UNMISET (May 02-May 05) 
El Salvador ONUSAL (Jul 91-Apr 95) 
Ethiopia, Eritrea UNMEE (Jul 00-Jul 08) 
Georgia UNOMIG (Aug 93-Jun 09) 
Guatemala MINUGUA (Jan 97-May 97) 
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Haiti 
 
UNMIH (Sep 93-Jun96); UNSMIH (Jun 96-Jul 97); UNTMIH 
(Aug 97-Nov 97); MIPONUH (Dec 97-Mar 00); MINUSTAH 
(Jun 04-Present) 
	   	  
India UNMOGIP (Jan 49-Present) 
Indonesia UNTAET (Oct 99-May 02) 
Kosovo UNMIK (Jun 99-Present) 
Lebanon UNIFIL (Mar 78-Present) 
Liberia UNOMIL (Sep 93-Sep 97); UNMIL (2003-Present) 
Mozambique ONUMOZ (Jun 97-Feb 99) 
Pakistan UNGOMAP (May 88-Mar 90); UNMOGIP (Jan 49-Present) 
Rwanda UNOMUR (Jun 93-Sep 94); UNAMIR (Oct 93-Mar 96) 
Sierra Leone* UNOMSIL (Jul 98-Oct 99); UNAMSIL (Oct 99-Dec 05) 
Somalia UNOSOM I (Apr 92-Mar 93); UNOSOM II (Mar 93-Mar 95) 
Sudan UNMIS (Mar 05-Present); UNMISS (Jul 11-Present); 
UNISFA (Jun 11-Present); UNAMID (Jul 07-Present) 
Syria UNDOF (May 74-Present) 
Tajikistan UNMOT (Dec 94-May 00) 
Timor-Leste UNMIT (Aug 06-Present) 
Uganda UNOMUR (Jun 93-Sep 94) 
Western Sahara MINURSO (Apr 91-Present) 
*Italicized countries constitute countries used in this research  
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